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Justice Traynor and the Conflict of Laws
BR~nmD Cutu*
Conflict-of-laws cases come before appellate courts only sporadically.' In his entire career, an individual appellate judge may
be called upon to write an opinion concerning a problem of conflict
of laws in only a handful of cases. Not only so, but the thoughts
required for insight and innovation in matters of conflict of laws
are long, long thoughts; a busy appellate judge does not have the
time for such reflective thinking, especially when the problems
presented are not recurrent.2 It is therefore not likely that many
reputations for judicial greatness will be found to rest primarily
on contributions to the theory of conflict of laws. Contrariwise, a
judge may be great even though he may be singularly unperceptive
when confronted with the esoteric mysteries of the conflict-of-laws
system. Mr. Justice Cardozo confessed his bafflement and sense of
futility in this field, 3 and his highly regarded opinion in Loucks v.
Standard Oil Co., while almost piously liberal by comparison with
some of the precedents, seems completely insensitive to the possibility that the New York dependents of the New York decedent
might have been given the full protection provided for them by
New York law--a possibility that has now been made a reality by
* A.B. 1937, LL.B. 1935, Mercer University; LL.M. 1941, J.S.D. 1955, Columbia University; Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
1. There is a widely held belief, which I share, that many cases are treated as if they
were purely domestic because counsel do not recognize potential conflict-of-laws problems
suggested by foreign aspects. So far as I am concerned, this is just as well, though it has
been deplored on occasion. See Kales, Presumption of the Foreign Law, 19 Htnv. L. Rav.
401 (1906), discussed in Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58
COLUm. L. Rav. 964 (1958).
2. Any academic criticism of judicial work should acknowledge, expressly or impliedly, the advantage the academician has in terms of time. I should like to make the acknowledgment explicit and quite personal. In 1957-1958 1 wrote a commentary on justice
Traynor's decision in Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953). See Currie,
Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN€.L.
REv. 205 (1958). Before undertaking this commentary I spent some two months in a fulltime effort to organize my ideas concerning methods of analyzing conflict-of-laws problems. See Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict of Laws Method, 25
U. Cm. L. Rav. 227 (1958). Then I devoted another two months of full-time concentration to the article on Grant v. McAulifle. But Justice Traynor's opinion in that case was
only one of the 31 that he wrote, on the average, every year, in addition to participating
in the disposition of the other cases decided by the court-at that time, approximately 1,500
per year.
3. C~mozo, Tar PARADoxEs or LEGAL ScsaucE 67-68 (1928).
4. 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
5. See Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws:
Equal Protection, 28 U. Can. L. Rav. 1, 47 (1960). In fairness to Cardozo it must be added
that the plaintiff did not attempt to invoke New York law.
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the New York Court of Appeals.' Mr. Justice Holmes' pragmatism
was crushed out by his dedication to territorialist dogma, and he
fashioned decisions on conflict of laws of which it is difficult to
think him capable." Other great judges have mixed records in the
area. Judge Hand wrote doubletalk in Scheer v. Rockne Motors
Corp.,8 in Louis-Dreyfus v. Paterson S.S. Ltd.,' and in Wood &
Selick Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique;° but in

Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert,Inc 1 he paved the way for the Supreme Court's epoch-making decision in InternationalShoe Co. v.
Washington.? Mr. Justice Brandeis had an instinct for the sound
result but seldom articulated clearly the controlling considerations;" and on one occasion he formulated as constitutional doctrine one of the most treacherous fallacies of the system? 4 Mr. Justice Black is the author of the admirable opinions in Watson v.
Employers Liab. Assur. Corp?5 and Hoopeston Canning Co. v.
Cullen,1" but is more consistent in the results he reaches than in the
analysis on which his results are based'
Who are the modern American judges whose work has contributed to enlightenment and to the cause of justice and reason
6. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 N.E.2d 526 (Ct. App.
1961). The majority opinion of Chief Judge Desmond in this case reached a perfectly
sound result, but by a process of reasoning singularly calculated to invite criticism of the
decision and attacks on its constitutionality. Instead of forthrightly declaring that the
policies expressed in the relevant New York law would be consistently applied for the
benefit of New York residents, the opinion rested on such vulnerable propositions as that
the measure of damages is a question of procedure, and that, while the Massachusetts
statute provided the basis of recovery, a defense available under that statute was contrary
to New York's public policy. See generally Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of
Law: Governmental Interests and the judicial Function, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 9 (1958).
7. The worst is Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912), discussed in Currie, supra
note 1, at 984-85; Currie, Book Review, 27 U. Cm. L. Rav. 588 (1960). See also Slater v.
Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904). The strange offspring of these precedents was
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914), discussed in Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U.
Cm. L. REv. 9, 69-70 (1958). In Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922),
discussed in the article last cited at 31-35, Holmes contributed some incredible technical distinctions to reach a result that was distasteful to him as well as probably unsound-and
never discussed the real problem presented by the facts.
8. 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934).
9. 43 F.2d 824,72 A.L.R. 242 (2d Cir. 1930).
10. 43 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1930).
11. 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930).
12. 326 U.S. 310, 161 A.L.R. 1057 (1945).
13. See, e.g., Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171 (1916), discussed in Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the judicial Function, 26
U. Cm. L. REv. 9, 73-74; Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 74 A.L.R. 701 (1930),
discussed in id. at 43-44.
14. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 82 A.L.R. 696 (1932), discussed in Currie, supra note 13, at 23-30.
15. 348 U.S. 66 (1954), discussed in Currie, supra note 13, at 48-52.
16. 318 U.S. 313 (1943).
17. Compare Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951), with Wells v. Simonds Abrasive
Co., 345 U.S. 514, 519 (1953) (dissenting opinion). See Currie, The Constitution and
the "Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 HtAv. L. Ray. 36, 63 n.103 (1959).
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in the conflict of laws? One thinks of Mr. Justice Stone, whose
opinions in Alaska PackersAss'n v. IndustrialAcc. Commn 18 and
PacificEmployers Ins. Co. v. IndustrialAcc. Comm'n opened this
metaphysical realm to the humanizing influence of sociological
jurisprudence."0 One thinks of Mr. Justice Jackson, not only for
his opinion in Lauritzen v. Larsen"' but also for his recognition of
the importance of the full faith and credit clause and of the responsibility thereby imposed on Congress.2 One thinks of Judge
2
One
Wyzanski for his sensible opinion in Gordon v. Parker.
thinks (perhaps without recalling his name) of the justice of the
Minnesota Supreme Court who wrote the opinion in Schmidt v.
DriscollHotel,Inc." And I think of Roger Traynor as having long
since earned a place of distinction in this select group.
This will be no paean of adulation. Like other judges, Justice
Traynor has had relatively few conflicts cases to decide; I wish, and
I gather he wishes, that more would come his way. Like other
judges, he lacks leisure to develop a comprehensive philosophy of
conflict of laws while scores of cases of all kinds press for his attention. Like other judges, he must work within the framework of
precedent, and it would be surprising if he did not have to temporize from time to time to win the concurrence of enough of his
brethren to form a majority. This will be an attempt to study objectively the opinions he has written in conflict-of-laws cases, and
to appraise his handling of the problems. Even in advance of that
study, however, it can be said that Justice Traynor himself has provided a most informative insight into the contribution he is in a
position to make to improving the administration of justice so far
as the conflict of laws is concerned:
In certain fields, as currently in Conflict of Laws, the wilderness
grows wilder, faster than the axes of discriminating men can keep it
under control. The concepts in the Restatement have been shattered
18. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
19. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
20. See Currie, supra note 7, at 19-30. I do not share Professor Freund's enthusiasm
for Stone's decision in Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927). See
Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 H-Lv. L. REv. 1210, 1212-21
(1946). But that decision was rendered in the free-wheeling days of Swift v. Tyson, 41
US. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), when there were no base lines for the development of a rational
system of conflict of laws in diversity cases.
21. 345 U.S. 571 (1953), discussed in Currie, The Silver Oar and All That: A Study
of the Romero Case, 27 U. Gus. L. Rav. 1, 65-75 (1959).
22. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45
CoLr. L. REv. 1 (1945), in AssoclAvrox or A-mmcmA LAw ScHoois, Sa.axcTED RA.DiNOs or; CoNFLiCr or LAws 229 (1956).
23. 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949).
24. 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957). The name was Thomas Gallagher, Associate Justice.
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by the devastating attacks of Cook and Lorenzen, and the compelling
logic of the proposition that in the area between the prohibition of the
due process clause and the mandate of the full faith and credit clause,
local law is supreme, has made it necessary to search for acceptable doctrines to govern the making of exceptions to local law, and serve as the
basis of a new and realistic system of conflict of laws. The demolition of
obsolete theories makes the judge's task harder, as he works his way out
of the wreckage; but it leaves him free to weigh competing policies
without preconceptions that purport to compel the decision, but in fact do
not. He has a better chance to arrive at the least erroneous answer if the
scholars have labored in advance to break ground for new paths. If they
have not, he must chop his own way through, however asymmetrically,
and hope that scholars will speed their reinforcements to the job in
hand.2 5

Here is more than the healthy skepticism that is required of any
good judge; here is complete disillusionment so far as the orthodox
concepts of conflict of laws are concerned. Here is hunger for true
systematic guides to the objective decision, to replace the guides that
have proved false. Here is willingness to accept the challenge: to
search for guidance in what Stone called the "energizing forces"
of the law.26 Contrast this willingness to abandon the shattered
edifice and accept the challenge of reconstruction with Cardozo's
resigned, though reluctant, acquiescence in the system:
Fields there are in the domain of law where fundamental conceptions
have been developed to their uttermost conclusions by the organon of
logic.... One finds it again in one of the most baffling subjects of
legal science, the so-called Conflict of Law. We deal here with the
application of law in space. The walls of the compartments must be
firm, the lines of demarcation plain, or there will be overlappings and
encroachments with incongruities and clashes. In such circumstances,
the finality of the rule is in itself a jural end. I do not mean that even in
this sphere the judge who seeks to reach the heart of a concept, its inmost
implications, may not find, when he has gained the core, that the concept is one with policy and justice. All this may be true, yet when I view
the subject as a whole, I find logic to have been more remorseless here,
more blind to final causes, than it has been in other fields. Very likely
it has been too remorseless. 27

Finally, and significantly, Justice Traynor's statement on conflict of laws is a becoming recognition of the limitations under
25. Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U. I.L. L.F. 230,
234. (Footnotes omitted.)
26. Stone, The Future of Legal Education, 10 A.B.A.J. 233, 234 (1924).
27. CAimozo, THE PA-RADox2s oF LEoAL SCmINc 67-68 (1928).
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which a judge searches for new principles when iconoclastic scholars have destroyed faith in the old. It is a cry for help, to which
there has been meager response: the American Law Institute, for
example, responds by restating the Restatement. If, therefore, we
of the cloistered precincts have fault to find with Traynor's opinions
in conflict-of-laws cases-if we sometimes think his methods disingenuous, if he is suspected of indulging a predilection because
there is no articulated general principle on which he can rely-the
fault is our own. We have failed to do the part of the job that judges
cannot be expected to do. While it is true that a great judge's flashes
of intuition can accomplish more than could a brace of pedants in
a decade, it is only those who have both professional competence
and time for research and reflection who can be charged with responsibility for systematic improvement of the law.
I. CHoICE oF LAW

Justice Traynor's opinions on questions of choice of law are
heavily outnumbered by those dealing with the jurisdiction of
courts and the effect of judgments. Yet choice of law is the central
problem of conflict of laws, and some of Justice Traynor's boldest and most controversial opinions have dealt with this problem.
Hence it seems appropriate to begin the discussion here. Next it
will be in order to dispose of certain miscellaneous matters, leaving
the cases on jurisdiction and judgments until last because of their
importance and because at least one of them requires more than
cursory examination.
Traynor's second opinion in a conflict-of-laws case concerned
choice of law: it was a dissenting opinion concerning the statute of
limitations, rendered in Ohio ex rel. Squire v. Porter." Concisely
stated, the situation was this: Under the banking laws of both Ohio
and California, stockholders were subject to a "superadded" liability in an amount equal to the par value of their stock. In Ohio
the liquidator of an insolvent bank was allowed six years in which
to enforce this liability, the time running from the date on which
he determined the bank's insolvency. In California a period of
three years was allowed, the time running from the date of the
28. 21 Cal.2d 45, 129 P.2d 691, 143 A.L.R. 1432 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 757
(1943). The first conflict-of-laws opinion was in Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal.2d 108, 109
P.2d 701 (1941), discussed in pt. III infra.
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assessment. The Ohio liquidator's action against a California stockholder was brought less than two years after the date of the assessment and less than three years after the determination of insolvency. Yet the Supreme Court of California held the action barred
by California's three-year statute of limitations.
Even readers familiar with the ways of courts in conflict-of-laws
cases will find it a challenging task to reconstruct independently
the rationale of such a decision. If the case had been entirely domestic to California the action would have been timely; if it had
been purely domestic to Ohio the action would also have been
timely. Where, then, was the conflict of laws? And how could the
action have been barred since it was filed within the time allowed
by either statute?
Startling as the result may seem, the majority opinion of Justice
Shenk flows along plausibly enough, using the stock rhetoric of the
conflict-of-laws system: It is "well settled" that the statute of limitations of the forum governs the time for commencement of an
action predicated on foreign law. The California statute requires
that the action be filed within three years after "the liability was
created." To determine when the liability was created there must
be reference to the foreign law; this, indeed, is "required" by the
full faith and credit clause. Under the Ohio cases the liability of
the stockholders is "direct and self-executing," and is created, if not
when the bank incurs the obligation, at least as early as the day on
which the bank fails to meet its current obligations. That day was
February 27, i933-three years and three months prior to the filing
of the action. Thus the action was filed more than three years after
the liability of the stockholders was "created." Q.E.D. The action
is barred.
Justice Traynor's dissent-joined only by a temporary member
of the court-was devastating. First he reviewed the history of the
California statute limiting the time for enforcement of stockholders' liability. It was a strange statute of limitations. Most such
statutes speak in terms of a period following accrual of the right
of action; this one, however, spoke in terms of the time when the
liability was created, and that clause had been construed to mean
the time when the obligation is incurred, irrespective of the time
when the cause of action accrues. Thus if a corporation were to
borrow money, giving its promissory note payable in four years,
the stockholders could never be liable, because the statutory limi-
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tation period would begin to run from the date of the note, and the
right of action against the stockholders would be barred before the
note's maturity. History provided the explanation for this strange
state of affairs. Until i93o the California constitution had imposed
personal liability on all corporate stockholders. This anachronism
had inflicted hardship on stockholders and impeded the economic
development of the state by discouraging investment in California
enterprises. Judicial hostility to it had led to the strictest sort of
construction, and the otherwise unreasonable holding that the right
to enforce the liability might be barred before it could be asserted
was intelligible only as a deliberate mitigation of the harshness of
the constitutional provision. In this light, the statute was "no ordinary statute of limitations." It was a curtailment of the liability
itself.
After the constitutional provision imposing general stockholder
liability was repealed there remained no need for such a peculiar
statute of limitations, though it remained on the books together
with the cases giving it the highly restrictive interpretation. There
was no comparable hostility toward the double liability of bank
stockholders. Indeed, the California Supreme Court had held, in
applying the statute to the liability of bank stockholders, that the
limitation period began to run not when the obligation was incurred but when the assessment was made. Any other construction
would have made nonsense of the statutory scheme for enforcing
the liability.
There were Ohio cases holding that under Ohio law the liability
is created as soon as the debt is incurred, or no later than the date
on which the bank fails, but they had no effect on the limitation
period in Ohio. It was clear that that period began to run only
when the superintendent of banks made a determination of insolvency. The Ohio cases relied on by the court were simply not in
point. One of them held only that a stockholder who acquired his
shares after the bank suspended payments was not subject to the
superadded liability 9 The other held that the statutory period of
sixty days prior to insolvency during which stock transfers did not
relieve the transferor of liability ran backward from the date of
suspension of payments. 0 Justice Traynor generously cited four
additional Ohio cases, three of which said in so many words that
29. Squire v. Harris, 135 Ohio St. 449, 21 N.E.2d 463 (1939).
30. Bailey v. Ohio ex rel Squire, 32 N.E.2d 453 (Ohio App. 1936).
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the liability of the stockholders attaches as soon as the bank incurs
indebtedness;3" but none of these cases had to do with the statute
of limitations.
A statute of limitations, said Justice Traynor, is designed to bar
the action after the lapse of a reasonable time after the cause of
action has accrued. When California construed its limitation statute
in such a way that it could bar a foreign cause of action even before
its accrual it arbitrarily imposed as a prerequisite of suit a condition
impossible of fulfillment, on the pretext of regulating procedure. 2
Where but in the conflict of laws can courts talk themselves so
plausibly into indefensible results? For sheer perversity of result,
the decision in Porter is matched-ironically enough-only by a
unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio."3 That case
may be succinctly stated by a series of propositions:
The plaintiff sued in Ohio on a Florida contract which, according to Florida law, was a contract under seal.
2. The defendant pleaded the statute of limitations.
3. Ohio had abolished the seal, and the period of limitations for
all contracts in writing was fifteen years.
4. Ohio had a "borrowing" statute, making available to the defendant any shorter period of limitation prescribed by the law of
the state in which the cause of action arose.
5. The Florida limitation period for contracts under seal was
twenty years, and for simple contracts in writing five years.
6. The action was filed seven years after the right of action
accrued.
7. The Ohio Supreme Court (affirming the court of appeals)"'
held the action barred.
i.

Readers will hardly need to be told the process of reasoning in
this case; indeed, the point is that, despite the patent absurdity of
the result, it was possible for the court to couch its opinion in terms
that are respectable so far as conflict-of-laws theory is concerned. 5
31. 21 Cal.2d at 54, 129 P.2d at 696, 143 A.L.R. at 1439.
32. Citing Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 100 A.L.R. 1133 (1935), discussed in
Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of A4ction, 73 -arv. L. Rev. 268,
286-90 (1959).
33. Alropa Corp. v. Kirchwehm, 138 Ohio St. 30, 33 N.E.2d 655 (1941), appeal
dismissed, 313 U.S. 549 (1941) ("for want of a properly presented substantial federal
question").
34. Alropa Corp. v. Kirchwehm, 19 Ohio Op. 257, 36 N.E.2d 511 (1940).
35. Cf. Coral Gables, Inc. v. Christopher, 108 Vt. 414, 189 Ad. 147 (1937); Annot.,
109 A.L.R. 479 (1937).
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In such cases one wonders whether the court was simply bemused
by the metaphysics of the system or was capitalizing on it in order
to reach a result that could not be reached forthrightly. In this case
we are provided with a revealing clue: The action was brought to
recover the deficiency remaining after foreclosure of a mortgage
on real estate in Dade County, Florida. The defendant was not the
original mortgagor, nor had he actually signed any undertaking
to pay the obligation. The deed to him, however, recited the existing mortgage and stated that the grantee assumed and agreed to
pay it. The defendant held the land for less than three months,
and his grantee similarly assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage.
The defendant acquired the land on April 23, i925, and sold it on
July 25, i925.6"That, for the benefit of those too young to remember, was the period in which the frenzy of speculation in Florida
real estate was at its height.
No such consideration of makeshift equity appears to explain
the result in California's Portercase. True, the plight of the bank
stockholder in the depression may have aroused a degree of sympathy; but the double liability imposed on him was not unusual,
and was doubtless being enforced routinely under the laws of California as well as of other states. The court simply seems to have
started the conflict-of-laws machine by pressing what it thought
were the proper levers, and to have sat back complacently while
the machine ground out the result.
The law reviews received the Porterdecision in silence. That is
a pity, because Justice Traynor clearly pointed the way of escape
from the mechanical "logic" of the majority opinion. He said:
California has no policy necessitating the destruction of the substantive right of the foreign bank depositor to enforce the liability imposed
87
upon the bank's stockholders, and no interestin riding over such rights.

He did not develop this theme at length; after all, he had forty-two
other opinions to write in 1942. But what are law reviews for?
Here was a quite indefensible decision, purportedly dictated by
conflict-of-laws principles; here also, in the dissent, were common
sense, insight, and guidance as to how a rational method of analyzing conflict-of-laws problems might be developed. If legal scholars had been on the alert, might they not have been inspired by
36. 19 Ohio Op. at 257,36 N.E.2d at 512.
37. 21 Cal.2d at 55, 129 P.2d at 697, 143 A.L.R. at 1440. (Emphasis added.)
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this dissent to turn away from the banalities and the logic chopping
of the conventional system, and to develop a method of analysis in
terms of the policies and interests of the states involved?
Like most questions of conflict of laws, those relating to the
statute of limitations are both oversimplified and overcomplicated
by conventional doctrine. We say that, with certain exceptions, all
matters relating to limitation are procedural, or pertain to the
remedy, and so are governed by the law of the forum. We may
then become entangled, as did the court in Porter, in subsidiary
problems akin to the problem of characterization: The forum's
statute of limitations refers to the time when the liability is created;
so, somewhat inconsistently, we refer to the foreign law to determine when the liability was created. What has become of the controlling force of the law of the forum? What state's policies are
being furthered by this strange eclecticism that mixes bits of California law with pieces of Ohio law to reach a result not contemplated by either legislature? Can there be any doubt that the analysis suggested by Traynor is infinitely preferable? He would construe the California statute of limitations in order to determine the
legislative purpose, and how the statute must be applied in order
to effectuate that purpose. The policies expressed in a statute of
limitations may be multiple. Such a statute may reasonably be construed, for example, as protecting the plaintiff by assuring him of
a reasonable time in which to bring his action." More commonly,
as in the Portercase, other policies are relevant: protection of the
defendant against stale claims, and facilitating the administration
of justice by making room on crowded dockets for current business.
So far as the Portercase was concerned, the California statute quite
clearly allowed the liquidator (i) time in which to complete the
administrative task of determining whether and in what amount
an assessment was necessary, and (2) three years thereafter in which
to sue for enforcement of the liability. No more was required,
whatever the law of Ohio; after the lapse of this time California
policy required protection for its residents and its courts. No less
was required; no California policy for the protection of either defendants or courts called for a shorter period of limitation. By arbitrarily cutting off the right of action before the lapse of that time
California not only refused faith and credit to the laws of Ohio,
38. McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958); see Cox v. Roth,
348 U.S. 207 (1955).
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as Justice Traynor suggested, but also discriminated arbitrarily
against the depositors whom the liquidator represented."
Justice Traynor's next 40 choice-of-law case was a routine one,
involving the defense of accord and satisfaction in an action on a
contract made and to be performed in Oklahoma. " He was able
to rely on the Restatement for the proposition that the law of
Oklahoma, rather than that of California, was applicable; but there
was no difference between the two laws with respect to the issues
involved, and so no real conflict.
The next choice-of-law opinion is the opinion of the court in
Grant v. McAuliffe, 2 concerning which I have already expressed
my views in detail. ' The opinion was bitterly attacked because of
its unorthodoxy," and I undertook to defend it. I have no reason
to change my earlier views of the case, and little to add to them.
Professor Sumner's accusation that the decision was influenced
by the "sympathy factors" in the case-i.e., that the result was
legally unsound, and resulted from "sentimental bias in favor of
the injured plaintiffs, and unbecoming hostility to the archaism of
the Arizona law"4 5 -still rankles. True it is that, as between the
interests of an injured plaintiff and an archaic rule abating the right
of action upon the tort-feasor's death, Justice Traynor's sympathies
would be on the side of the plaintiff. After all, it was he who precipitated the overthrow of the rule of abatement in California's
39. See Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws:
Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 1323 (1960); Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional
Discriminationin the Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection, 28 U. Cm. L. Rev. 1 (1960).
40. In 1945 he had occasion to refer to conflict-of-laws principles as providing helpful
analogy where the problem was choice between state and federal law in a case of maritime
collision. Intagliata v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., 26 Cal.2d 365, 375, 159
P.2d 1, 8 (1945), 19 So. CAL. L. REv. 127. The opinion is interesting, however, not
for this incidental reference to conflict of laws but because it demonstrates a masterly
grasp of the delicate problems of federalism in maritime cases. Cf. D. P. Currie, Federalism
and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess", 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 1958. This is not surprising, though such versatility in a state-court judge is unusual. Traynor was also the
author of the court's scholarly opinion in Moore v. Purse Seine Net, 18 Cal.2d 835, 118
P.2d 1 (1941), affirmed sub nom. C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943).
41. Grayhill Drilling Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 39 Cal.2d 751, 249 P.2d 21 (1952).
42. 41 Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944, 42 A.L.R.2d 1162 (1953), 68 HARv. L. Rev. 1260
(1955), 29 N.Y.U.L. ReV. 1288 (1954), 27 So. CAL. L. Rev. 468 (1954), 1 U.C.L.A.L.
Rev. 380 (1954); see Shavelson, Survival of Tort Actions in the Conflict of Laws: A New
Direction?, 42 CALIFr. L. Rev. 803 (1954).
43. Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict of
Laws, 10 STAN. L. Rev. 205 (1958).
44. Sumner, Choice of Law Governing Survival of Actions, 9 HASmNGs L.J. 128
(1958).
45. Currie, supra note 43, at 216-17. Professor Sumner's criticism is contained in
CALIFOR'N A LAW REVsIoN CommtssioN, IecommENDA,=ON AND STUDy RELATNG TO CHOIcs
op LAw GovaRNo SuRevvAL oF AcnoNs 14 (1957).
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domestic law." But to suggest that the decision departed from
sound legal principles in order to reach a result congenial to the
predilections of the court is absurd. Nothing could be more unsound and indefensible than a rule, such as that contained in section 39o of the Restatement, commanding application of the law
of Arizona in the situation presented by Grant v. McAuliffe. It
is regrettable that Justice Traynor rationalized the result in terms
of alternative characterizations (treating the question as one of
procedure, or relating to administration of decedents' estates, rather
than of the substantive law of torts); inevitably, such techniques
create an impression that the system is being manipulated. 47 Yet
characterization is inherently a question-begging process. Despite
Professor Sumner's asseveration that "It is inescapable that the
basic problem is one of tort recovery,""3 there is just as much justification for treating the question as one of procedure or one relating to the administration of estates. The only rational choice
between the possible characterizations is one determined by the
result thereby produced; and since the result produced by Justice
Traynor's characterizations made sense instead of nonsense, his
characterizations were sound.
Still, one regrets that he chose this technique instead of spelling
out the considerations of policy and interest involved, as he had
done in the Portercase. But more than a decade had elapsed since
that case was decided, and the legal scholars who might have developed his approach into a substitute for the capricious traditional
system had done little or nothing in that direction. To win acceptance, the opinion had to wear traditional dress. In discussing Grant
v.McAuliffe recently, however, Justice Traynor has stated its rationale explicitly in terms of governmental policies and interests."
Injecting a delightful personal touch, he said further:
It may not be amiss to add that although the opinion in the case is
my own, I do not regard it as ideally articulated, developed as it had to
be against the brooding background of a petrified forest. Yet I would
make no more apology for it than that in reaching a rational result it
was less deft than it might have been to quit itself of the familiar speech
of choice of law.50
46. Hunt v. Authier, 28 Cal.2d 288, 169 P.2d 913, 171 AX.R. 1379 (1946)

(Shenk, J.).

47. Cf. Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 At. 163,
61 A.L.R. 846 (1928); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 N.E.2d
526 (Ct. App. 1961).
48. See Currie, supra note 43, at 213.
49. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TExmS . REV. 657, 670 (1959).
50. d.at 670 n.35.
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A fascinating subject for speculation remains. Now that Grant
v. McAuliffe has so completely exposed the absurdity of section 390
of the Restatement, 1 what will the American Law Institute do?
Obviously the section cannot be allowed to remain as it is. Yet how
can it be intelligently changed without abandonment of the fundamental assumptions as to choice of law on which the Restatement
is constructed ?2
The most recent Traynor opinion on choice of law is the opinion
of the unanimous court in Emery v. Emery." While a California
family was motoring in Idaho their car, driven by the son under
his father's direction, overturned, causing injuries to the driver's
two sisters. They sued the father and the brother. Justice Traynor
began conventionally enough, treating Idaho law as determinative
of the question whether the owner or the operator had violated a
duty of care owed to the nonpaying guests. However, finding that
the Idaho test ("reckless disregard of the rights of others") imposed
a lower standard of care than the California test ("willful misconduct"), he inquired only whether there had been "willful misconduct" under the California cases, on the theory that the affirmative
finding on that issue necessarily included a finding of "reckless disregard" under Idaho law. Thus nothing turned on this choice;
there was no conflict. Turning to the defense of parental immunity,
however, he encountered again the problem of characterization:
Is the question of immunity one of the law of torts, or of procedure,
or of incapacities imposed because of concern with the family relationship? Rejecting a Wyoming precedent applying the law of
the place of injury," and not even citing the Restatement," he said,
rather flatly, "It is not, however, a question of tort but one of capacity to sue and be sued and as to that question the place of injury
is both fortuitous and irrelevant.""6
One must say to Justice Traynor, as has been said to his critics,
51. ReSTATEMENT, CONa.iru op LAws § 390 (1934): "Whether a claim for damages
for a tort survives the death of the tort-feasor or of the injured person is determined by the
law of the place of the wrong."
52. Cf. ReSTrATEmNT (SEcoND), CONFLICT or IAWS §§ 332, 334(d) (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1960), for a possible straw in the wind.
53. 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955), 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1123 (1956), 30 So. CAL.
L. Rev. 368 (1957), 1 VrLL. L. Rev. 365 (1956); see Ehrenzweig, Parental Immunity in
the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason versus the Restatement, 23 U. Cm. L. Rev. 474
(1956).
54. Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d 302 (1954).
55. REsrATmNT, CONFLICT op LAws § 384(2) (1934): 'If no cause of action is
created at the place of wrong, no recovery in tort can be had in any other state."
56. 45 Cal.2d at 427, 289 P.2d at 222.
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that on the face of the matter there is about as much reason for
classifying this problem as one of substantive tort law as for classifying it as a question of capacity. It is only when the consequences
of the classification are considered that the soundness of the classification can be evaluated. Justice Traynor quickly reached that
aspect of the matter. After rejecting the view that the law of the
forum should control as governing matters of procedure, he said:
We think that disabilities to sue and immunities from suit because
of a family relationship are more properly determined by reference to
the law of the state of the family domicile. That state has the primary
responsibility for establishing and regulating the incidents of the family
relationship and it is the only state in which the parties can, by participation in the legislative processes, effect a change in those incidents.
Moreover, it is undesirable that the rights, duties, disabilities and immunities conferred or imposed by the family relationship should constantly change as members of the family cross state boundaries during
temporary absences from their home. Since all of the parties to the
present case are apparently domiciliaries of California, we must look
this state to determine whether any disabilities or imto the law of 57
munities exist.

Thus the opinion employs a combination of the techniques used
in Porterand Grantv. McAuliffe: alternative characterization, supported by pragmatic inquiry into the respective interests of the
states. The substantive characterization would make the result
depend upon the wholly fortuitous and irrelevant place of injury;
the procedural characterization would make the result depend
upon the plaintiffs choice of forum; the family-relations characterization, if generally accepted, would not only lead to uniformity
of result but would tend to advance the interest of the only interested state. Indeed, there was no real conflict."8 So far as appears,
Idaho had no policy requiring that these California children not be
permitted to sue their father, and no interest in the matter.
Having determined that the law of California was to be applied
to determine the questions of parental and sibling immunity, Traynor still had work to do. What was the California law? He answered, breaking new ground, that (i) an unemancipated minor
57. 45 Cal.2d at 428, 289 P.2d at 223.
58. See Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TExAs L. Rnv. 657, 669

(1959).

A rigid choice-of-law rule pointing to the law of the domicile would not, however,
work well in all situations. Thus if the law of the domicile does not permit action, there
may be conflict with the interest of the state where the injury occurred in requiring compensation for persons injured within its borders, and the state of injury should be free to
apply its own law.
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child may sue his parent for a willful or malicious tort, and (2) tort
actions between minor brothers or sisters are maintainable. These
are simply questions of domestic tort law, and call for only limited
comment in a discussion of the conflict of laws. The court's treatment of them, however, does throw light on one aspect of the
method of analysis in terms of governmental interests. When one
says that in a conflict-of-laws case a court should examine into the
policy of domestic law and the extent of the state's interest in
applying that policy, the reference is not necessarily to predetermined policy. The common law is no less dynamic in conflict-oflaws cases than in domestic cases. To appreciate this one need only
note that the sequence of the reasoning in Emery might have been
inverted. The court might first have determined the posture of
California law with respect to intrafamily immunities, and then
proceeded to determine whether the law of California or that of
Idaho was to control. Justice Traynor has stated the proposition
felicitously:
Should [the court] find that the local policy has not yet been articulated
in statute or precedent, it may proceed to articulate it for the first time,
for purely local as well as interstate cases, and thereby create an open
conflict with the other policy. Thus the court has a dual responsibility.
Within the confines of policy based on precedent, it can revise backward
local precedent to harmonize with an enlightened policy of another
state. It can also set an enlightened local precedent to conflict with the
backward policy of another state."
II.

MISCELLANEOUS CASES

i. Ancestral property: The estate of the childless widow. A
common-law lawyer must approach with diffidence, if not trepidation, anything that smacks of community property. Yet two of
Traynor's conflict-of-laws opinions touch that subject, and Estate
of Perkins"' presents a fascinating problem. I therefore grasp the
nettle, being somewhat emboldened by my belief that the problem
in Perkins will turn out not to be essentially one of community
property after all.
Mr. Perkins had resided in New York with his second wife for
many years prior to his death. He had been a successful banker,
and from time to time made substantial gifts of securities to his
wife; in addition, he named her as beneficiary of a policy of insur59. Traynor, supra note 58, at 673.
60. 21 Cal.2d 561, 134 P.2d 231 (1943), 31 CAliF. L. REv. 331.
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ance on his life. Shortly after his death the widow moved to California, taking with her money and securities thus acquired. When
she died intestate and without issue, domiciled in California, her
estate consisted, with exceptions not here material, of the remnants
of this property. She was survived by three sisters, who claimed
the estate; the adverse claimant was a son of Perkins by his first
marriage.
The son's claim was based on sections 228 and 229 of the California Probate Code. The first of these provided, at the time of the
widow's death:
If the decedent leaves neither spouse nor issue, and the estate, or any
portion thereof was community property of the decedent and a previously
deceased spouse . . . such property goes in equal shares to the children
of the deceased spouse and their descendants by right of representation. ....

Section

229

provided:

If the decedent leaves neither spouse nor issue, and the estate or any
portion thereof was separate property of a previously deceased spouse
and came to the decedent from such spouse by gift, descent, devise or
bequest . . . such property goes in equal shares to the children of the

deceased spouse and to their descendants by right of representation.

Now, in a manner of speaking, at least, the property in the widow's
estate was neither community property nor separate property, as
the latter term is used in a community property state. It was the
product of the husband's earnings during the marriage; and since
it had been earned while the couple were domiciled in New York,
his interest in it was that of sole common-law ownership. The gifts
to his wife transferred a like interest to her, and when she left New
York the property was hers, and hers alone.
The majority of the court held that, on the death of the widow,
this'property descended to the son under either section 228 or section 229. It was not necessary to decide which' The sections dealt
only with intestate succession, a matter entirely within the control
of the legislature. To give effect to the legislative policy embodied
in them it was necessary to apply them to all property subject to
administration in California, regardless of its acquisition in a com61. So the court said. Id. at 571, 34 P.2d at 237. Yet it also said that the purpose of
the sections would be fully carried out "if the probate court distributes the property upon
the basis of its classification had it been acquired in California." Thus it appears that the
court was applying § 228 on the basis of a classification of the property as community
property.
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mon-law jurisdiction. The court conceded that this involved reclassification of the property in accordance with California community property concepts. Estate of Thornton" was distinguished
on the ground that it held such reclassification invalid only when
it had the effect of unsettling vested rights-i.e., only when it affected rights inter vivos as distinguished from the expectancy of
inheritance. An earlier decision," holding that the sections would
be applied to property acquired out of the state only if the nature
of the foreign ownership was substantially the same as it would
have been had the property been acquired in California, was disapproved.
Justice Traynor wrote a vigorous dissent. The question was
solely one of statutory construction; the majority had "construed
the legislative purpose to extend beyond the legislative language
and then read into the language an implication that alone would
make possible the execution of the enlarged purpose."" If the
property in the widow's estate was not community property, section 228 could not apply; if it was not separate property of her
deceased husband, section 229 could not apply. The character of
the property could be determined only by reference to the definitions in the Civil Code. Under sections 162 and 163 separate property is defined as all property owned by either spouse before marriage or acquired afterwards by gift, bequest, devise, or descent,
together with the rents, issues, and profits thereof. Under section
164 all other property acquired by either spouse after marriage is
community property. The Perkins property was not community
property when it was acquired, nor was it converted into community property when its owner moved to California. Neither was it
"separate property," for that term "is but a differentiation from the
term 'community property' in section =a8.""
In short, the majority conceived of the terms "community" and
"separate" as being sufficiently comprehensive to describe all marital property subject to administration in California, while Justice
Traynor recognized a third class, not covered by those terms, including property acquired outside the state in common-law ownership. It is not easy to choose between these two conceptions on the
basis of the considerations discussed in the two opinions. It is
necessary to inquire into the legislative policy expressed in sections
62.
63.
64.
65.

1 Ca 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1, 92 A.L.R. 1343 (1934).
Estate of Allshouse, 13 Cal.2d 691, 91 P.2d 887 (1939).
21 CaL2d at 572, 134 P.2d at 238.
Id. at 575, 134 P.2d at 239.
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=8 and 229 of the Probate Code. Fortunately, we have available a
comprehensive and searching study of the history and purpose of
those sections.
The "germ" of these sections was first introduced into California
law in 188o, and clearly had the limited purpose of preventing
escheat.6 If the decedent were a widow or widower with no relafives, it seemed unjust that what had been community property
should escheat, to the exclusion of relatives of the predeceased
spouse whose efforts had presumably contributed to its accumulation. The original statutory provision was limited to correcting this
situation. In 19o5 the principle was extended to that portion of
the estate which had been separate property of the predeceased
spouse, and a wholly new principle was introduced: the right of
the heirs of the predeceased spouse to inherit was made contingent
only upon the decedent's having died without issue, instead of without kindred, as before. 8 On this new principle, the statute could
no longer be regarded as simply designed to prevent unjust escheat.
It now stated a policy of preference for the heirs of the predeceased
spouse over those (other than lineal descendants) of the decedent.
It became, in fact, a reversion to the common-law concept of ancestral property, i.e., the rule that collateral relatives of the person
last seized were entitled to inherit only when they were "of the
blood of the first purchaser.""
In this light, the statute stated a policy that was by no means
peculiar to the institution of community property. A community
property state can get along without such a policy:
There is apparently nothing in the community property system which

necessitates the rules of descent laid down by sections 228 and 229 of
the Probate Code. While California has always had the law of community property, the principle of these Probate Code sections was not
introduced into our law until 19o5. With the exception of New Mexico,
the community property system exists
none of the other states in which
70
have any such rules of descent.

Common-law states, on the other hand, may have substantially
identical policies71 Thus Ohio even now has a provision almost
66. Ferrier, Rules of Descent Under Probate Code Sections 228 and 229, and Proposed Amendments, 25 CAipr. L. REv. 261 (1937).
67. Ibid.
68. Id. at 262.
69. Id. at 280.
3
70. Id. at 282-8 .
71. Id. at280-81 nn.54-57.
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indistinguishable from that of California," and Indiana has a
similar provision, except that it operates to limit the estate which
the surviving spouse can inherit from the one dying first, instead
of upon the distribution of the estate of the surviving spouse."
In this light, the statement of the majority in Perkins seems not
unreasonable: "Sections 228 and zz9 together provide for the succession of all property in which the predeceased spouse had some
interest."7 It is only if one concentrates on the distinctive institution of community property, and on the special connotation of
"separate" property as that term is used in contradistinction to community property, that difficulties of characterization arise. Both the
majority and the minority opinions suffer, it seems to me, from their
assumption that "reclassification" of common-law property according to the concepts of the community system was involved; the
majority's concession on this point was unnecessary, and served
only to becloud the issue with problems of the sort associated with
Estate of Thornton.7 Certainly if the legislature had enacted a
single statute providing for the distribution of all property in the
estate of the decedent in which the predeceased spouse had any
interest, and which came to the decedent either by the voluntary
act of the predeceased spouse or by operation of law, there would
have been no problem of reclassification. Of course, Justice Traynor's point was precisely that the legislature had done no such
thing, but had legislated only with respect to community property
and its correlative, separate property. Yet if one is persuaded by
the legislative history and by common-law analogies that the legislature was not here primarily concerned with regulating the incidents of community property, but with a policy of intestate succession taking account of the source from which the property was
acquired, the proposition that in this context, at least, the terms
"community property" and "separate property" exhausted the possibilities seems preferable to Justice Traynor's insistence that the
earnings of the husband while domiciled in a common-law state
are not "separate property" as defined by the Civil Code.
This view may be tested by a hypothetical case. Assume that a
husband and wife domiciled in California agree that their future
earnings shall be their separate property, respectively. It seems clear
72.
73.
74.
75.

OMo Rav. CODE ANN. § 2105.10 (Page 1954).
IND. ANN.STAr.§ 6-201(b) (1953).
21 Cal.2d at 569, 134 P.2d at 236.
1 Cal.2d 1, 33 P.2d 1, 92 A.L.R. 1343 (1934).
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that this may be done.7" The husband's earnings accumulate, and
at his death he leaves the property to his widow. Upon her death
intestate and without issue will this property pass under the "ancestral property" principle to the lineal descendants of the predeceased husband, or will it go to the heirs of the widow? Clearly,
this was never community property. Nor was it, any more than
the property accumulated by Perkins in New York, "separate"
property as defined by the California Civil Code: i.e., it was not
property acquired before marriage or acquired thereafter by gift,
bequest, devise, or descent. What was it? In one case, such property
is referred to as being held "in severalty."7 In another it is said that
"it is clear that in California we have a modified form of certain
estates known to the common law and have them operating alongside of the community property system ... ."" This would seem
to be one of them. In substance, for the purpose of sections 228 and
229, this property seems to be strictly analogous to that acquired
by Perkins in New York and given by him to his wife.
I have found no case squarely determining the applicability
of those sections to property that would be community but for the
agreement of the parties to the contrary; yet, quite apart from the
decision in Perkins,it seems altogether probable that such property
would be subject to the provisions of section 229. The California
Supreme Court has said that from the statutes defining community
and separate property "it must follow that all property not held as
community property must, for want of a better name, be classed
as separate property."

9

On that basis, the earnings of the husband

which, by agreement, are not community property, are separate
property although they do not fit the statutory definition of separate property; and they are reached by section 229, which uses the
somewhat inappropriate term "separate property" for want of a
better name."
76. CAL. Cxv. CODE § 158; Commissioner v. Mills, 183 F.2d 32, 19 A.L.R.2d 856
(9th Cir. 1950); Estate of Watkins, 16 Cal.2d 793, 109 P.2d 417 (1940); Siberell v.
Siberell, 214 Cal. 767, 7 P.2d 1003 (1932); Perkins v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co., 155 Cal. 712,
103 Pac. 190 (1909); Wren v.Wren, 100 Cal. 276, 34 Pac. 775 (1893); Fay v.Fay, 165
Cal. 469, 473-74, 132 Pac. 1040, 1042 (1913) (dictum); Marlow v.Barlew, 53 Cal. 456
(1879) (dictum); see Van Every v.Commissioner, 108 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1940). But cf.
the dictum inCommissioner v.Cavanagh, 125 F.2d 366, 369 (9th Cir. 1942): "Of course
no voluntary agreement between the parties is sufficient to affect the marital status in such
a manner as to impress upon property the status of that of unmarried persons."
77. Marlow v. Barlew, supra note 76, at 458, 461.
78. Siberell v. Siberell, 214 Cal. 767, 771, 7 P.2d 1003, 1004 (1932).
79. Id. at 770, 7 P.2d at 1004. (Emphasis added.)
80. Cf. Justice Traynor's remark in Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal.2d 754, 759, 146
P.2d 905, 908 (1944): "The separate property of a nonresident husband or wife invested
in California land remains separate property.
...(Emphasis added.)
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A suggestive case is Estate of Watkins."1 All the property owned
by the married couple (domiciled in California) was originally
community property. Certain later transactions were alleged to
have converted it into "joint tenancy property"; but the court found
that, even assuming this to be true, the still later execution by the
parties of joint and mutual wills, declaring all the property to be
community property, had the effect of reconversion. Hence, upon
the death of the surviving wife, the property passed in accordance
with section 228, with shares going to the relatives of the predeceased husband. The trial court, not appreciating the effect of the
declaration in the joint and mutual wills, had held that the property in the widow's estate was not community property but property
held in joint tenancy, and so did not pass under section 228 but
went entirely to the heir of the widow. 2 Assume for the moment
that the joint and mutual wills were not in the picture, and that
the parties had, as the trial court found, effectually converted their
community property into a joint tenancy. What kind of estate was
this ? It was not a community estate; neither was it "separate" estate
within the definition of the Civil Code, though the respective shares
might be so called for want of a better name. It was quite analogous
to a common-law estate of the same character, and was such that
the interest taken by the wife on the death of the husband was her
sole, or several, or "separate" property, as at common law. How it
should be disposed of on her death is another question. But it seems
to follow from this that when the parties voluntarily convert community property into an analogue of common-law property the
resulting interests may without violence to the system be referred
to as separate property, though they are not literally within the
definition; and from this it follows, in turn, that in our hypothetical
case the estate of the widow should be distributed according to
section 229, on the basis that the property accumulated by the husband's earnings was separate property, acquired from him by gift,
bequest, devise, or descent.
If this is so, what is the obstacle to treating the property acquired by Mr. Perkins in New York as his "separate" property,
given by him to Mrs. Perkins, and subject to the provisions of sec81. 16 Cal.2d 793, 108 P.2d 417 (1940).
82. Section 228 as in force at the date of the widow's death (1936) applied only to
community property and did not contain the present provision extending the coverage to
joint tenancies. Cal. Stats. 1931, ch. 281, § 228, at 597. Section 229 did not apply because
the interest acquired by the survivor upon the death of a joint tenant was not one acquired
by gift, descent, devise, or bequest.
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tion 229? No "reclassification" in accordance with community
property concepts seems necessary. The policy of the statute seems
clearly applicable: the property was accumulated through the
efforts of the husband; in the judgment of the legislature it is just
that it should go to his son rather than to the collateral heirs of his
second wife. The nature of Mr. Perkins' common-law interest was
essentially the same as that of a California husband who has agreed
with his wife that his earnings shall be his sole property.!3
Justice Traynor's most telling points were made in connection with his contention that it would be incongruous to treat the
property earned by Mr. Perkins in New York as "separate" property. "It is a strange construction that interprets the term 'separate
property' in a California statute to include the very kind of property
it was designated to exclude" 8 -i.e., property resulting from the
earnings of the husband during the marriage. "To treat such earnings as if they were separate property would do violence to the
scheme of succession embodied in Probate Code sections 228 and
229, which contemplates that in the event both spouses die without
lineal descendants, marital earnings are to be inherited equally by
the respective families of the two spouses by whose efforts it was
' But these arguments seem to lose their force if
accumulated."85
we are right in assuming that a California couple can agree that
their respective earnings shall not be community property, and that
the husband's earnings will then be treated as separate property
under section 229. No more violence is done to California's policy
by letting the fruits of the husband's common-law earnings pass
from his widow's estate to his heirs, to the exclusion of the collateral
heirs of his widow, than is done by allowing California husbands
83. In Estate of Allshouse, 13 Cal.2d 691, 91 P.2d 887 (1939), adopting the principle that property acquired elsewhere could be subjected to §§ 228 and 229 only if the
incidents of ownership were substantially the same as those of community property
or separate property in California, the court declined to treat property resulting from the
husband's earnings during the marriage in Missouri as substantially comparable to "separate" property. "It differs from the husbands' separate property in that it includes the
wife's right of dower, which although inchoate is exceedingly valuable." Id. at 699, 91
P.2d at 891. But the wife's inchoate right of dower in property which she acquires outright from her husband seems totally irrelevant to the interpretation of a statute concerned
with the source from which the property was acquired.
84. 21 Cal.2d at 577-78, 134 P.2d at 240.
85. Id. at 576, 134 P.2d at 239-40. Justice Traynor was here referring to an aspect
of the statutory scheme not directly involved in the Perkins case. Under § 228, relating
to community property, if there were no lineal descendants of the predeceased husband, the
property is divided equally between his heirs and those of the widow; whereas under § 229,
dealing with separate property, the only takers were the heirs of the predeceased spouse.
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and wives to contract for what are in effect common-law interests
with the same result."
One final point: The construction contended for by justice
Traynor might well raise a substantial question as to equal protection of laws." If the younger Perkins had been denied the right
to inherit, might he not with some justification have complained
that he was arbitrarily being denied equal treatment with persons
similarly situated ? California had established a policy to the effect
that in a family situation such as was presented in that case, the
fruits of the predeceased husband's earnings should go to his son
rather than to the collateral heirs of the second wife. If the property
had been earned while the elder Perkins was domiciled in California, that would be the result; similarly, if the property had been
earned under a no-community agreement while he was domiciled
in California, that would be the result. What reason is there for
differential treatment simply because the property was earned in a
common-law state?
A state may, of course, establish reasonable classifications without violating the equal protection clause; but what would be the
reasonable basis for distinguishing between the case of property
acquired in a common-law jurisdiction and that acquired under
similar circumstances in California? The most effective answer
would be that the policy of sections =8 and 229 is so intimately
related to the community property system that its application to
common-law interests would be inappropriate. We have seen, however, that this is not true; that policy has no peculiar relevance to
the institution of community property. Another possibly effective
answer might be that as a matter of convenience California was
disinclined to trace the origins of property brought into the state
by its owner from another jurisdiction; but there is little support
for such an attitude in the cases. In Allshouse, indeed, the court
indicated its willingness to engage in a form of tracing more
arduous than that required by the result in Perkins. It might be a
sufficient answer that California was disinclined to apply its policy
in such a way as to interfere with the interest of New York; but
86. Cf. Estate of Allie, 50 Cal.2d 794, 329 P.2d 903 (1958). Premiums on the husband's National Service Life Insurance policy had been paid from community earnings;
the wife was named beneficiary; on her death the proceeds of the insurance were held
distributable under § 228 as community property, although because of federal law they
could hardly be so characterized for any purpose except that of intestate succession.
87. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XV. See generally Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional
Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection, 28 U. Cm. L. Rav. 1 (1960).
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it is difficult to conceive how New York could have an interest in
the intestate distribution of the estate of a widow who had long
since left that state and established a domicile in California." Possibly it might be a satisfactory answer that California was simply
disinclined to apply its policy to common-law property interests
because to do so would be to upset the justifiable expectations of
the parties: e.g., when Mr. Perkins gave the property to his wife
in New York he thought he was doing so with no strings attached,
and did not contemplate that it might some day revert to his son;
and Mrs. Perkins received the property on the same understanding.
But this explanation does not square very well with the universally
conceded proposition that the statute deals only with the right to
inherit intestate property, which is a mere expectancy, and that
Mrs. Perkins could very easily alter the pattern of succession to the
property on her death by changing her domicile-whether to a
community property state or not. Nor does it square very well with
California's general policy of applying its truly community-oriented
rules of intestate succession to common-law property brought into
the state by married couples who become domiciliaries." Whether
or not the construction urged by Justice Traynor would amount
to a denial of equal protection, the question is so dose, and it is so
difficult to suggest a convincing basis for the reasonableness of the
classification, that avoidance of the possibility of discrimination
may be suggested as a further justification for the construction
adopted by the majority.
My conclusion, then, is that the result reached by the majority
hardly called for dissent, and that the major flaw in the majority
opinion was the apparent willingness to treat the Perkins property
as community property under section 228 rather than separate
property under section 229 . "
88. Although the California policy is for the benefit of the predeceased spouse and his
heirs, who so far as appears never had any connection with California, I assume that California had an interest in applying the policy because the estate was being administered in
California and the decedent was domiciled there. See Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. Rav. 205, 221-22 (1958).
It would not be a satisfactory answer to the younger Perkins that he was not given the
benefit of the statute because California had no interest in applying its policy for his protection because neither he nor his father had any connection with the state. See Currie &
Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 1323 (1960); Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination
in the Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1960).
89. CAL. PnOB. COD § 201.5.
90. The distinction, though not material in Perkins, would be material if the predeceased spouse is not survived by lineal descendants, in which case community, but not
separate, property would be divided among the heirs of the respective spouses. See note
85 supra.
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Community property. Tomaier v. Tomaier9 was a divorce

action between domiciliaries of California in which the trial court
had divided as community property real estate in California and
Missouri purchased with community funds and held "in joint
tenancy." The district court of appeal reversed, and on retrial the
trial court excluded evidence that the intention of the parties was
that the property should remain part of the community. The supreme court unanimously reversed, Justice Traynor writing the
opinion, holding such evidence admissible not only as to the
California real estate but also as to that in Missouri.
The decision seems unquestionably sound, and only one real
problem in the conflict of laws is suggested.92 In discussing the
Missouri property Justice Traynor cited the Missouri case of
Depas v. Mayo 3 and said: "Since Missouri would protect the respective interests of a husband and wife if community funds were
invested in Missouri land without the wife's consent, it would certainly protect such interests when the Missouri property is acquired
pursuant to an agreement between the parties that the property
retain its community character."" This sounds like section 238 of
the Restatement: "The effect of marriage upon an interest in land
acquired by either or both of the spouses during coverture is determined by the law of the state where the land is."9 But does it
really matter what Missouri would decide with respect to the respective interests of the parties in this property? Leaving aside the
constitutional questions that would be raised by an attempt by
Missouri to alter the character of those interests," is it not clear
that the California court, having two California domiciliaries
before it in a divorce proceeding, can and should enter whatever
decree for division of the marital property is called for by California
law and policy, irrespective of the law of Missouri? In the course
91. 23 Cal.2d 754, 146 P.2d 905 (1944), 32 CALIF. L. REV. 182, 17 So. CAL. L. REv.
401.
92. A question of domestic law arises, which is best not discussed in this context and
by this noncommunity writer: What difference did it make whether the property was
part of the community or was held in joint tenancy? "In its holding, as distinguished from
its language, the Siberell case [note 78 supra] established only that whether such property
is a joint estate or community property, the trial court in a divorce proceeding has the
power to divide the property equally." 23 Cal.2d at 759, 146 P.2d at 907.
93. 11 Mo. 314, 49 Am. Dec. 88 (1848).
94. 23 Cal.2d at 759, 146 P.2d at 908.
95. REsTATEMENT, CoNFLicT oF LAws § 238 (1934); REsTATEMIMNT (SEcom), CONFLiCT or L.Aws § 238 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959). Justice Traynor did not cite this section,
though he did cite § 260, which is similar in principle.
96. Cf. Estate of Thornton, 1 Cal.2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934).
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of the events leading to the well-known case of Fallv. EastinT the
courts of Washington, the domiciliary state, entered a decree dividing the property and directing the conveyance of Nebraska real
estate in a manner that would not have been permissible under
Nebraska law. Yet the Nebraska court, while refusing enforcement
to the decree, conceded that if the husband had made a conveyance
in compliance with the decree it would have been perfectly effectual."5 And in the recent case of Rozan v. Rozan'? Justice Traynor, for a unanimous court, held that real estate in North Dakota
purchased with community funds was community property, subject
to division by the divorce decree, without making any reference to
the law of North Dakota. No such reference is necessary, the Restatement to the contrary notwithstanding.
3. Groundsfor administration:wrongful death. A resident of
New Mexico and a resident of Arizona were killed in New Mexico
in the course of their employment by the Atchison, Topeka &Santa
Fe Railway, a Kansas corporation. The railroad was doing business
in California-specifically, in the two counties in which petitions
were filed for letters of administration. The petitions alleged that
the Federal Employers' Liability Act created a cause of action for
wrongful death in each case, authorizing suit by the administrator
in any state where the carrier does business. Neither decedent had
other assets in California. Section 301 of the Probate Code authorized administration only in the county in which the decedent was
a resident, or where he left "estate." For a unanimous court,
Justice Traynor held that the causes of action constituted "estate"
authorizing administration; to hold the contrary would be to nullify the right given by the act."'
The decision is noncontroversial and in accord with most, if not
all, authorities. Only a subsequent development raises a minor
question as to whether it can be relied on as still stating the law of
California. Ten years later the California court recognized the
doctrine of forum non conveniens,1 . according to which wrongful
97. 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
98. Fall v. Fall, 75 Neb. 104, 128 (1905) (dictum): "In the instant case, if Fall had
obeyed the order of the Washington court and made a deed of conveyance to his wife of
the Nebraska land, even under the threat of contempt proceedings, or after duress by imprisonment, the title thereby conveyed to Mrs. Fall would have been of equal weight and
dignity with that which he himself possessed at the time of the execution of the deed."
See Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. Cm. L. Rav. 620, 636
(1954).
99. 49 Cal.2d 322, 327-28, 317 P.2d 11, 13-14 (1957).
100. Estate of Waits, 23 Cal.2d 676, 146 P.2d 5 (1944).
101. Price v. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry., 42 Cal.2d 577, 268 P.2d 457 (1954).
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death actions in cases of the type involved in Estate of Waits" 2 may
not be maintainable in California?0 ° Does this development alter
the rule that letters of administration may issue? Probably not.
Dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds is a discretionary matter, most appropriately determined after the action has been filed.
Probably the courts will continue to grant letters of administration
on the ground that the venue provisions of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act permit suit against the carrier in California, leaving
the question of forum non conveniens to be determined on motion
in the wrongful death action itself. It would be simpler, however,
if California would simply permit the foreign administrator to sue
in wrongful death cases,1 . without requiring a local appointment
which in the end may prove futile.
4. Criminalmatters. Criminal cases having foreign aspects tend
to fall between two stools, in the academic world at least. They are
given scant attention either in the course on conflict of laws or in
criminal law courses. That they deserve more careful study than
they get is strongly suggested by certain cases encountered in the
preparation of this paper.
California's habitual-criminal statute allows conviction when
prior offenses were committed in another state, provided the minimum elements of the foreign offense are substantially similar to
the minimum elements of one of the offenses enumerated in the
California statute °5 One Morton was adjudged an habitual offender, one of the prior convictions having been in Tennessee. The
principal evidence as to the nature of the crime for which he had
been convicted was a record from the files of the Tennessee State
Penitentiary showing that he had served a term for a crime designated by the initials "HBL." There was some testimony, which
the court found insufficient, tending to indicate that this meant
"housebreaking with intent to commit larceny"; there was no evidence at all as to the minimum elements of the offense under Tennessee law, and the court set aside the conviction.10 ' The People,
said Justice Traynor, must prove the alleged prior convictions
beyond a reasonable doubt; it was not unreasonable to require the
People to ascertain the particular statute that the defendant had
102. 23 Cal.2d 676, 146 P.2d 5 (1944).
103. See Douglas v. New York, N.H. &H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
104. See Ghilain v. Couture, 84 N.H. 48, 146 Ad. 395, 65 A.L.R. 553 (1929).

105. CAL. PN. CODE § 644(a).
106. People v. Morton, 41 Cal.2d 536, 261 P.2d 523 (1953).
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violated, or to obtain a certified copy of the judgment of conviction
for the purpose of proving the elements of the offense. 07
The interesting thing about this decision is that there was in
force a California statute authorizing the court to take judicial
notice of "the laws of the several states of the United States and
the interpretation thereof by the highest courts of appellate jurisdiction of such states."'08 Assuming the court had been satisfied
with the testimony as to the meaning of the initials "HBL," why
did it not simply take judicial notice of the elements of that offense
under Tennessee law? The explanation may be that the question
was not reached, since the testimony as to the meaning of the
abbreviation was unsatisfactory. I prefer to think, however, that
the fact that neither Justice Traynor, nor any member of the
court, nor counsel for the People thought of the judicial-notice
statute in this context demonstrates the sound common sense of all
concerned. If the statute had been brought to the attention of the
court it would have been held inapplicable, I cannot doubt, despite
the generality of its language. Law reformers have pressed legislation calling for judicial notice of foreign law without adequate
analysis; whatever may be said in favor of such legislation, it seems
clear that it should not relieve the state of establishing guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt in criminal cases, and that it should not infringe
the right to trial by jury." 9
People v.Burr

° was

an appeal from a conviction for soliciting

the prosecutrix to commit the crime of extortion. The evidence
showed that the defendant in Los Angeles solicited the prosecutrix
to induce men in the Los Angeles area to go with her for immoral
purposes to Tijuana, Mexico, where she would join the defendant
in acts that would constitute extortion as defined by the law of California. The defendant contended that to punish him for soliciting
the prosecutrix to commit in Mexico acts that would amount to
extortion as defined by California law would be to punish him for
acts done beyond the jurisdiction of the state. In a fine opinion for
a unanimous court, Justice Traynor rejected this extreme territorialist defense, construing the statute on solicitation in order to
107. Id. at 539, 541,261 P.2d at 525, 526.
108. CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 1875(3).
109. See Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 CoLum. L. REV.
964, 1019-21 (1958).
110. 45 Ca.2d 311, 288 P.2d 503, 51 A.L.R.2d 948 (1955), 7 HAIMNGs L.. 206
363 (1956).
(1956), 29 So. CAL.L. ,Mv.
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determine the legislative policy and the circumstances in which that
policy must be applied to effectuate the state's interest:
Section 653 f is concerned not only with the prevention of the harm that
would result should the inducements prove successful, but with protecting inhabitants of this state from being exposed to inducements to
commit or join in the commission of the crimes specified . . . and the
evils it seeks to prevent are present whether the object of the solicitation
is to be accomplished within or without this state. Thus, in the present
case the defendant used the prospects of large monetary rewards to attempt to induce the prosecutrix to commit acts of prostitution and extortion, with residents of this state as intended victims. Such solicitation
is inimical to the public welfare and to the safety and morals of the
inhabitants of this state, regardless of where the solicited acts are to be
performed, and a construction of section 65 3f that limits its operation
to solicitation of acts that are to be consummated within this state would
defeat, rather than effect, the object of that statute.""'

The contention that the prosecution should have been required to
prove that the acts solicited would have constituted extortion under
the law of Mexico was similarly rejected: "Since it is the solicitation in this state alone that is punishable, and since it is immaterial
where the acts solicited are to be performed, the law of other states
governing such acts is likewise immaterial ... and proof of the
law of Mexico was therefore unnecessary."'1 2
The only cause for regret here is that the court chose to distinguish, rather than to discredit, its earlier decision in People V.Buffum," 3 on which the defendant relied. There the defendants had
been convicted of conspiracy "to induce miscarriages contrary to
section 274" of the Penal Code. The evidence tended to establish
that the defendants conspired in California to perform, and did
perform, abortions in Mexico. Overt acts were committed in California; the defendants and the subjects were all apparently residents
of California. The conspiracy statute provided for the punishment
of conspiracy "to commit any crime." "' There was evidence that
abortion was criminal under Mexican as well as California law.
Yet the convictions were reversed: "The statute makes no reference
to the place of performance of an abortion, and we must assume
that the Legislature did not intend to regulate conduct taking place
111. 45 Cal.2d at 314, 288 P.2d at 505-6, 51 A.L.R.2d at 951.
112. Id. at 315, 288 P.2d at 506.
113. 40 Cal.2d 709, 256 P.2d 317 (1953).
114. CAL.PEN. COD § 182.1.
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outside the borders of the state.""" Why must the court make any
such assumption? Is one to believe that California has no policy
against crimes committed in Mexico by residents of California
against other residents of California, or no interest in the effectuation of such a policy? If one Californian lures another to Mexico
and there murders him is California indifferent or helpless ? Surely
there is no lack of power."' The question, as the California court
recognized, is only one of statutory construction. In spite of generations of territorialist dogma, California's criminal statutes might
well be reasonably construed as extending to crimes perpetrated by
Californians against other Californians outside the state. 1 '
Not every criminal statute, of course, should be construed as
regulating conduct outside the state. People v. One 1953 FordVictoria"' was a proceeding to forfeit an automobile used for the unlawful transportation of narcotics. The car had been purchased
from a dealer in Texas who held a chattel mortgage. Without the
dealer's consent and contrary to a term of the mortgage the buyer
took the car to California, where it was seized. The California
statute allowed the innocent holder of a mortgage to claim his interest free from forfeiture if he had made a reasonable character
investigation of the purchaser at the time of sale. Texas had no law
relating to forfeiture of vehicles used in the transportation of narcotics; the dealer made no character investigation, though he was
otherwise innocent. For a unanimous court, Justice Traynor
held the requirement of a character investigation inapplicable to
the dealer in Texas. The purpose of the law was, by regulating the
conduct of those financing automobile sales, to reduce the probability that the cars sold would be used to violate California law.
But it was not reasonable to assume that the legislature intended
to require dealers in every state to make character investigations
115. 40 Cal.2d at 715, 256 P.2d at 320, citing inter alia the discredited case of American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
116. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 20-21 (1955) (dictum).
Since 1861, murder or manslaughter committed by a British subject on land out of the
United Kingdom has been punishable in England, irrespective of the nationality of the
victim. Offenses Against the Person Act, 1861, 24-25 Vict., c. 100, § 9.
117. Justice Traynor wrote no opinion in Buflum, but concurred in the majority
opinion. Distinguishing Buflum in his opinion in Burt, he did not foreclose entirely the
possibility of constructions giving criminal statutes extraterritorial effect: "Since the Legislature is not ordinarily concerned with regulating conduct in other jurisdictions . . . and
since [the conspiracy statute] suggests no answer to the many difficult questions that
would otherwise arise from the conflict in California law and the law of other states,
that section may reasonably be interpreted as limited to conspiracies to commit crimes in
this state." 45 Cal.2d at 314,288 P.2d at 505.
118. 48 Cal.2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957).
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against the contingency that automobiles sold would be taken to
California without their consent and contrary to the sales agreement. The case is a fine illustration of how a court may, by defining local interests with moderation and restraint, avoid conflict
with the interests of another state. 19
III. JL]DGNMNTS

i. Foreign alimony decrees. The principle that a court may
and should apply domestic law in such a way as to effectuate domestic policy where the state has a legitimate interest in so doing
has no application to judgments within the scope of the full faith
and credit clause' 2 Congress, in the exercise of its power to implement that clause, has declared that "records and judicial proceedings" of the courts of a state "shall have the same full faith and
credit in every court within the United States ... as they have by
law or usage in the courts of such State ... from which they are
taken."'' This means that in a suit to enforce the judgment of a
sister state the policies of the forum are irrelevant. Justice Traynor's
first conflict-of-laws opinion-the opinion of the court in Biewend
v. Biewend'--dealtwith the problem of the approach to an intermediate type of case: Given a foreign judgment not entitled to full
faith and credit, is governmental-interest analysis to be applied as
in an ordinary case of choice of law, or are domestic interests to
yield by analogy to the case of a judgment entitled to full faith and
credit? The problem is not an easy one. With respect to foreign
judgments for alimony, however, Justice Traynor exhibited not
only faithful devotion to the full faith and credit clause but also a
strong disposition to treat sister-state judgments as if they were
fully within the command of that clause although the Supreme
Court has not so held.
The parties were divorced while domiciled in Missouri, and the
husband was ordered to pay weekly alimony. Thereafter they
119. In a recent discussion of the decision Justice Traynor has explicitly stated its
rationale in terms of governmental policy and interest. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really
Necessary?, 37 Ta%.As L. REv. 657, 672-73 (1959).
120. U.S. CONsr. art. IV, § 1.
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1958). The attempt of the revisers of the judicial Code in
1948 to apply the same rule to the acts of state legislatures was meaningless and ineffectual.
See Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the
Judicial Function, 26 U. Cm. L. Rav. 9, 19 (1958); Currie, The Constitution and the
"Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 HxAv. L. Rav. 36, 82 n.162 (1959).
122. 17 Cal.2d 108, 109 P.2d 701 (1941), 29 CAun. L. Rav. 754, 25 MANN. L
Rav. 946.
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moved to California, and the wife sued not only to recover accrued
installments but to establish the husband's obligation to make
future payments. In the meantime the minor children who had
been taken into account when the alimony was fixed had attained
majority, and the wife had married and divorced a second husband.
A California statute".. provided that alimony payments shall cease
upon the wife's remarriage. Although Justice Carter, in dissent,
made a strong argument that the statute expressed an important
policy that ought to be furthered, justice Traynor held that as a
matter of comity California would respect and enforce the rights
created by the Missouri decree until they were modified by the
Missouri court. The mere difference between Missouri and California as to the right of the wife to alimony after remarriage did
not amount to such a strong local public policy as to justify a refusal
to enforce vested rights: "[Enforcement of the decree] offers
no threat to either the moral standards or the general interests of
the citizens of this state. To hold that the right created in Missouri
is so immoral as to be unenforceable here would involve a complacent attribution of moral superiority to this state."'24
Such language must cause some initial uneasiness to an advocate
of the governmental-interest analysis. This is very close to traditional conflict-of-laws doctrine: "local public policy" is something
different from the legal policies expressed in the laws of the state;
only a very strong moral revulsion against the enforcement of rights
"vested" under another law justifies the interposition of local policy.
The uneasiness is relieved only when we recall that it is a judgment
that is involved, not simply a choice of law. Even apart from the
full faith and credit clause a judgment presents a special case. The
plaintiff is not simply claiming the benefit of the laws of Missouri
in nubibus; there has been an adjudication that she personally has
certain rights against the defendant under those laws. Especially
in light of the fact that the alimony provisions of divorce decrees
are commonly arrived at by agreement, it is not farfetched to liken
the Missouri decree to a contract between the parties, entered into
under circumstances giving California no interest in regulating its
incidents. Moreover, the truth may be that the Biewend case does
not really present the problem of how governmental interests shall
fare in competition with a foreign judgment not entitled to full
123.

CAL. CIV. CODE §

139.

124. 17 Cal.2d at 114, 109 P.2d at 705.
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faith and credit. It may be that modifiable decrees for future installments are entitled to full faith and credit, and that Justice
Traynor was simply ahead of his time in treating them as if they
were:
Neither the full faith and credit dause of the Constitution nor the
Act of Congress implementing it says anything about final judgments
or for that matter, about any judgments. Both require that full faith
and credit be given to "judicial proceedings" without limitation as to
finality. Upon recognition
of the broad meaning of that term much may
1 25
some day depend.

If this is the ultimate explanation of the decision, however, the
defense of conflict with strong "local public policy," impliedly recognized by Justice Traynor, must be rejected.
In Biewend the court recognized that the husband was entitled
to apply to the Missouri court for modification of the decree in the
light of the changed circumstances, but held that the decree should
be enforced as it stood until such time as it should be modified by
the Missouri court. A student commentator suggested that it might
have been more appropriate for the California courts themselves
to modify the decree, applying the law of Missouri. 28 This was the
result reached in Worthley v. Worthle. some fourteen years later.
The action was to recover arrearages under a New Jersey separate
maintenance decree and to establish the obligation to make future
payments pursuant to it; the decree was modifiable both prospectively and retroactively. A closely divided court, Justice Traynor
writing for the majority, held not only that the decree would be
enforced but that the California court should try the issue of modification on its merits. The strong implication was that the question
of modification would be determined in accordance with the law
of the rendering state 28
125. Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 87 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring).
126. 29 CALIF. L. lRv. 754, 757-58 (1941).
127. 44 Cal.2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955), 8 ALA. L. REv. 118 (1955), 31 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 397 (1956), 3 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 247 (1956), 1956 WAsH. U.L.Q. 246.
In the meantime, Justice Traynor wrote the opinion of the unanimous court in
Howard v. Howard, 27 Cal.2d 319, 163 P.2d 439 (1945). The defendant husband resisted
enforcement of a Nevada decree incorporating a property settlement agreement on the
ground that the agreement had been obtained by fraud. Distinguishing "extrinsie" from
"intrinsic" fraud, the court held the decree not subject to collateral attack. The decision
is clearly right, and requires no comment.
128. 44 Cal.2d at 474,283 P.2d at 25.
The overruling of Biewend, insofar as it held the decree modifiable only by the state
of rendition, is only a mild indication that Justice Traynor possesses one of the rarest
traits of the great judge: the ability to confess error. For a dramatic instance, see People
v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434,282 P.2d 905 (1955).
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Although Worthley v. Worthley in enforcing a modifiable foreign decree rejected the rule of the Restatement,' the decision was
acclaimed by the law reviews;.. and, indeed, it is difficult to understand objections to the result in view of its practical utility. The
interesting question relates not to the enforceability of the foreign
modifiable decree, nor to the freedom of the court in which enforcement is sought to modify the decree, but to choice of the law governing modification. In a nonconflicts situation the Supreme Court
has held that due process requires that the defendant be given
notice and an opportunity to be heard on the question of modification before judgment is entered against him;... but this does not
necessarily mean that the law of the rendering state is controlling.
The analogy of custody decrees points away from the dominance
of that law. The Supreme Court has said of such decrees that "it
is clear that the State of the forum has at least as much leeway to
disregard the judgment, to qualify it, or to depart from it as does
the State where it was rendered";... and it is easy to imagine a case
in which the state originally rendering the judgment has lost all
interest in the matter, while the state in which custody is being litigated has a compelling interest in the application of its own law
in the interests of the child's welfare. Where alimony decrees are
concerned it may be necessary to distinguish between the grounds
for and the limits of modification'3 I find the problem a difficult
one,' " and shall not attempt to suggest a solution in this context.
The problem has been thoughtfully analyzed in a student law
review comment 3 which provides an excellent point of departure
for intensive study.
In Hopkins v. Hopkins.. Justice Traynor, writing for a majority of the court, held that the California court in which a divorced
wife sought to enforce a Colorado decree embodying a property
settlement agreement could determine for itself what proportion
of the gross monthly alimony and support payments was "'reasonably necessary for the support, maintenance, and education'" of
129. R=ASTEMENT, CONFLiCT op LAws § 435 (1934).
130. See comments cited note 127 supra.
131. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946).
132. New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 615 (1947). (Emphasis
added.)
133. See Comment, 26 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 136, 145 (1958).
134. See Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Inters
and the judicial Function,26 U. Cm. L. REv. 9, 82 (1958).
135. See note 133 supra.
136. 46 Cal.2d 313, 294 P.2d 1 (1956).
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the children during their minority, and thus determine the amounts
to be paid to the plaintiff, the children having attained the age of
majority. In Lewis v. Lewis"" he held for a unanimous court that
an ex parte Nevada divorce, obtained by the husband while an
action for divorce was pending in Illinois, could not be pleaded as
a defense to the wife's action on the Illinois alimony decree: The
Nevada decree should have been pleaded as a defense in the Illinois
proceeding. In Kubon v. Kubon38 he dissented from a holding that
the wife's violation of a California temporary restraining order
relating to custody constituted a "clean hands" defense to her suit
on a Nevada decree for accrued arrearages. This brief, stark recital
does not do justice to the careful judicial workmanship that is evident in the three opinions; but all three are so clearly right that
there is nothing more to say.
2. The eflect of ex partedivorce decrees on the rightto support.
Prior to 1942 there was little reason for state courts to consider
critically the effect of divorce on the right to support. The easy
assumption that such rights were mere incidents of the marital
status, and terminated with it, was not often subjected to stress.
In the extreme case, where a husband abandoned his wife and established a domicile in a sister state, procuring a divorce there and
returning to the marital domicile, the problem was not acute; the
state of marital domicile was free to disregard the foreign divorce,
and enforce the duty to support.' 9 The first Williams case, 4 9 however, radically altered the situation by requiring full faith and credit
to such divorces. The blow was softened by the holding of the
second Williams case ' that the effect of such a divorce could be
avoided by a showing that the divorcing spouse was not in fact
domiciled in the rendering state; but this was not an easy path of
refuge for the abandoned wife. 4" By what appears to have been a
fortunate coincidence, the Court had occasion on the same day to
intimate indirectly that the right to support might survive such a
divorce, even if the jurisdiction of the divorcing court could not be
successfully attacked, if that right, by the law of the wife's domicile,
137. 49 Cal.2d 389, 317 P.2d 987 (1957), discussed further at notes 158 and 165
inira.
138. 51 Cal.2d 229, 233, 331 P.2d 636, 638 (1958).
139. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
140. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 143 A.L.R. 1273 (1942).
141. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 157 A.L.R. 1366 (1945).
142. "The burden of undermining the verity which the Nevada decrees import rests
heavily upon the assailant." Id. at 233-34, 157 A.L.R. at 1371.
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could survive a valid divorce. 3 The proposition that, although the
divorce might effectually dissolve the marital relation, it could not,
in the absence of personal jurisdiction over the wife, affect her
financial interests, was expressly advanced by three justices in concurrence, although a resolution of that question was not necessary
to the decision.'" In the course of time the proposition came to be
fully established.' 45 The time had come for most of the states to
reexamine critically the nature of the right to support, and whether
it could survive a valid divorce. If it did not survive an ex parte
decree, it ought to.
The question was very obliquely presented to the California
Supreme Court in Dimon v. Dimon.4 ' The parties were married
in Oregon; they separated, and thereafter the wife obtained an ex
parte divorce in Connecticut. Since the validity of the divorce was
conceded, we must assume that she was domiciled in Connecticut
at the time. Later, when she was a resident of Oregon and the exhusband a resident of Nevada, she sued in California for alimony.4
The majority, without discussing the relevance of the law of any
other state, held that in California the wife's right to support does
not survive divorce. Justice Traynor dissented from this portion
of the opinion, maintaining that "the wife's right to support, although arising out of the marriage, is not lost by dissolution of the
marriage unless it could have been litigated in the proceedings" for
divorce.'48 After a painstaking review of the California authorities
he concluded that, while no case had squarely held that an independent suit in equity would lie after divorce to enforce the duty
of support, there were substantial indications that such was the law.
Then he indicated forthrightly the basis for his concern. The case
before the court involved only the right of a nonresident wife who
herself had obtained the ex parte divorce. If no more had been involved, perhaps he would not have been moved to dispute the
majority's conclusion so vigorously. But recent developments in
143. Esenwein v. Commonwealth ex rel. Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279, 280, 157 A.L.R.
1396, 1397 (1945).
144. Id. at 281-83, 157 A.L.R. at 1398-99.
145. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 1
A.L.R.2d 1412 (1948).
146. 40 Cal.2d 516, 254 P.2d 528 (1953), 37 M1ARQ.L. Rnv. 279 (1953-1954), 26
So. CAL. L. REv. 325 (1953).
147. One wonders about the reasons for this choice of forum, and whether such an
action would not be likely to be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds since the
decision in Price v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 42 Cal.2d 577, 268 P.2d 457, 43 A.L.R12d 756
(1954). Neither the majority nor Justice Traynor doubted the propriety of retaining jurisdiction. 40 Cal.2d at 525, 540, 254 P.2d at 532, 541.
148. Id. at 532, 254 P.2d at 536.
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the law of full faith and credit meant that "If a valid ex parte
divorce is granted the husband by another state, the California wife
may be protected only if she is allowed a subsequent action for
support."'' The law of California should keep pace: "Since the
courts have evolved rules of law that allow the husband readily to
obtain a divorce, corresponding rules of law must be invoked to
protect the wife and prevent injustice. Accordingly, we should give
effect to an ex parte foreign decree obtained by the husband insofar
as it affects marital status, but declare it ineffective on the issue of
alimony, thus accommodating the interests of each state by restricting it to matters of her dominant concern."'' 0 In the state of
the precedents, this need be understood as nothing more than an
argument that, since existing law did not clearly preclude suit for
alimony after divorce, practical considerations dictated resolution
of the ambiguity in favor of the right. It may mean more: It may
mean that judicial conclusions reached in earlier times should be
reevaluated in the light of new conditions, not then in contemplation. If so, it is not to be stigmatized as judicial legislation, but
is simply the common-law tradition at its best.
As we shall see, the central question whether the right to support survives a valid ex parte divorce was settled later. Before pursuing that story, however, we may notice an interesting sidelight
of the Dimon case.
Unlike the majority, Justice Traynor was interested in the law
of Connecticut, although the greater part of his opinion is devoted
to California law. It is not clear whether the parties properly invoked the foreign law; probably they did.'' If not, the inquiry into
foreign law on appeal was questionable practice, irrespective of the
judicial notice statute." 2 In that event, the preferable procedure
would have been to dispose of the case according to the law of the
forum; but this is, in effect, what Justice Traynor proposed when,
finding Connecticut law inconclusive, he indulged the familiar presumption that the common law of the foreign state is the same as
149. Id. at 539, 254 P.2d at 540.
150. Id. at 539-40, 254 P.2d at 541.
151. It appears that the plaintiff based her action "upon the theory that under the
law of Connecticut she had a right to support at the time of the divorce. . . ." Id. at 531,
254 P.2d at 536. And Justice Traynor said, "No Connecticut decisions have been discovered or cited by the parties that directly pass on the question whether a wife domiciled
in Connecticut at the time of an ex parte divorce decree may subsequently bring an action
for support." Id. at 542, 254 P.2d at 542.
152. See Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLmi. L. REv.
964 (1958).
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that of the forum 5 On the assumption that Connecticut law was
properly invoked, it is clear that Justice Traynor was rightly concerned about the posture of that law. Thus if Connecticut, the state
of the wife's domicile at the time of divorce, had no law and policy
allowing survival of the right to support, California (having no interest in the matter) would have denied full faith and credit to the
Connecticut decree by imposing that duty on the husband 3 4 On
the other hand, if by Connecticut law the right to support survived
a valid ex parte divorce obtained at the suit of the wife, as Justice
Traynor assumed, the case may present one of the most troublesome
problems in modern conflict-of-laws analysis: the problem of the
disinterested third state1 55 Assume that the husband was at the
time of the divorce and thereafter domiciled in Nevada, and that
Nevada recognized no duty of support after a valid divorce. There
would then be a clear conflict of interests between Connecticut and
Nevada, Connecticut having an interest in the allowance of support
for the wife domiciled there, and Nevada having an interest in the
protection of its domiciliary from such liability. The conflict would
pertain only to choice of law, not to the recognition of judgments:
the Connecticut decree could not, in the absence of personal jurisdiction over the husband, adjudicate the right to support. Hence
neither Nevada nor California would be compelled by the full faith
and credit clause to recognize the right to support asserted under
Connecticut law. Having no interest in the matter at all, what
should California do? To weigh and choose between the competing state interests would be to exercise a purely legislative judgment. To concoct a "rule" that the law of the wife's domicile "governs"'58 would be to do the same thing sub silentio and by mere fiat.
In the absence of congressional implementation of the full faith
and credit clause, it seems that the best course for California to
follow-if it is to adjudicate the case at all-would be to apply the
law of the forum simply by default. That law is presumptively
applicable, 57 and neither party has sustained the burden of showing
that a particular foreign law is entitled to preference. This is the
153. 40 Cal.2d at 542, 254 P.2d at 542.
154. Id. at 540,254 P.2d at 541.
155. See Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws,
28 U. Cm. L. REv. 258 (1961).
156. As New York did, in substance, in a similar situation. See Dean v. Dean, 241
N.Y. 240, 149 N.E. 844, 42 A.L.R. 1398 (1925); Currie, Married Women's Contracts:
A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 227, 257 n.55 (1958).
157. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547-48 (1935).
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result that both the majority and Justice Traynor would have
reached, but by different routes and with different consequences.
The majority did not consider the relevance of foreign law, and
concluded that in California the right to support terminated upon
divorce. Justice Traynor considered the Connecticut law (though
not that of Nevada) ;18 found the Connecticut cases inconclusive;
and applied California law (under which, according to his view,
the right to support survived) because of the presumption that the
law of Connecticut was to the same effect.
If, instead of the wife's obtaining the ex parte divorce in Connecticut, the husband had obtained it in Nevada, the same problem
of the disinterested forum would be presented. At first sight it may
seem that this is not so, because an element of due process is involved: Lacking jurisdiction of the person of the wife, Nevada is
powerless to affect her financial rights. But this assumes that her
rights are fixed by the law of Connecticut rather than by the law
of Nevada. Here we are not concerned with the effect of the divorce
decree: Concededly it cannot affect personal rights, but the question
is whether she has any right to support that survives divorce. Thus
if Connecticut should hold that there is no such right under Connecticut law it is not a denial of due process for Connecticut to treat
the Nevada divorce as terminating the right to support. It is not
lightly to be assumed that the law of Connecticut is necessarily to
be applied. Connecticut is free to apply its own law, to be sure, but
if, as I believe, Nevada is equally free to apply its own, there is no
denial of due process if Nevada refuses to grant support to the wife
on the ground that its law recognizes no right of support after
divorce °
Worthley v. Worthley 6° which has already been discussed with
reference to the enforcement of foreign modifiable decrees, 1 ' pre158. Cf. Lewis v. Lewis, 49 Cal.2d 389, 317 P.2d 987 (1957), where, discussing an
ex parte divorce obtained by a husband in Nevada, Justice Traynor said, citing Nevada
cases: "The decree would terminate plaintifi's right to support if she were a Nevada
domiciliary." Id. at 391 n.*, 317 P.2d at 989 n.1.
159. The question whether the right to support survives a valid ex parte decree
obtained by the wife, as distinguished from one obtained by the husband, is purely a
question of domestic law. That is to say, it does not present the question of due process
that is presented where the husband is the plaintiff. A discussion of the question would
therefore not be appropriate here, and I shall say only that I am inclined to sympathize
with Justice Traynor's humanitarian view that the wife who cannot obtain personal jurisdiction of her husband should not be treated as having forfeited her support rights by
suing for divorce. The argument is persuasive in the case of the deserted wife; but I am
troubled by the case of the California wife who could easily sue for divorce and alimony
there, but chooses instead to obtain an ex parte divorce in Nevada.
160. 44 Cal.2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955).
161. See text accompanying note 127 supra.
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sented the question as to the effect on support of ex parte divorce
somewhat more directly. After the wife had obtained her New
Jersey decree the husband obtained an ex parte divorce in Nevada.
For the majority, Justice Traynor, referring to New Jersey law,
held the divorce ineffective to cut off the wife's right to support
under the decree. This troubled Justice Spence, who dissented. If
it was the law of California, as he believed, that a valid divorce
terminates all rights to support, even those embodied in a decree,
so that a California wife's rights would be lost upon her husband's
obtaining a valid ex parte divorce, it seemed to him anomalous to
say that California must enforce the rights of a nonresident wife
in similar circumstances-especially rights under a foreign decree
modifiable both prospectively and retroactivelyY 2 This position
is challenging enough to warrant a closer look at the majority
opinion.
Said Justice Traynor:
Since the full faith and credit clause compels recognition of the
Nevada decree only as an adjudication of the marital status of plaintiff
and defendant and not of any property rights that may be incident to
that status ... the effect of the dissolution of the marriage on defendants preexisting obligations under the New Jersey maintenance decree
must be determined by the law of New Jersey.1 63

One may well ask: Why must that question be determined by
reference to New Jersey law rather than by reference to the law of
Nevada or California ?'6" In the absence of the New Jersey judgment-i.e., if the question were simply one of choice of law-there
would be as much reason to apply the law of Nevada, or perhaps
of California, as to apply the law of New Jersey, so far as principles
of conflict of laws or of constitutional law are concerned. This was
not a mere matter of choice of law, but of rights that had ripened
into judgment; yet if the judgment was not entitled to full faith
and credit the question of choice of law was, theoretically at least,
as open as if there had been no judgment.
It is necessary to bear in mind two things to understand Justice
Traynor's position here. First, he differed with Justice Spence as
to the state of the California law regarding the effect of divorce;
in applying the law of New Jersey he was applying what he thought
162. 44 Cal.2d at 475-76, 283 P.2d at 26.
163. Id. at 468, 283 P.2d at 21.
164. We must assume that the husband was domiciled in Nevada at the time of the
divorce. It does not appear whether he was domiciled in California at the time of the
pending action.
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was California law as well. Second, he was by no means prepared
to disregard the New Jersey decree and proceed as if the question
were merely one of choice of law. As the discussion of the Biewend
case has shown, he was supported by a majority of the court in his
attitude that modifiable foreign decrees for alimony and support
are to be treated as if they were entitled to full faith and credit, even
though the Supreme Court has not so held. If California is disposed
to do so, and it appears to be, it may subordinate local interests, or
the interests of another state such as Nevada in our example, to
foreign rights embodied in a judgment. This explains to my satisfaction the ready determination that New Jersey law was applicable: The New Jersey judgment was being given the same faith
and credit as it had by law or usage in the state from which it was
taken. The same analysis applies to Lewis v. Lewis, 6' which carried
the process a step further by recognizing an Illinois wife's rights
to alimony under a decree obtained after the husband had obtained
an ex parte divorce in Nevada.
When the question whether a wife's right to support under
California law survives a valid ex parte divorce was squarely presented. 6 to the California Supreme Court, Justice Traynor's affirmative view, first expressed in dissent,"'7 prevailed16 Doubtless this
result was facilitated by the California court's previous protection
of the rights of wives under the law of New Jersey and Illinois;.6
basically, however, Justice Traynor had convinced a majority of
the court that, even though two precedents would have to be overruled, 7 California law should be adjusted to the new conditions
created by the Supreme Court's decisions regarding full faith and
credit to ex parte divorces." '
165. 49 Cal.2d 389, 317 P.2d 987 (1957), discussed in text accompanying note 136
supra.
166. This is perhaps an exaggeration: the case might have been decided on other
grounds. See Hudson v. Hudson, 52 Cal.2d 735, 746,344 P.2d 295, 301 (1959) (McComb,
J., concurring); Baldwin v. Baldwin, 28 Cal.2d 406, 416-17, 170 P.2d 670, 676-77 (1946).
But Justice Traynor and all but one of his brethren doubtless felt that the time had come
to settle the issue.
167. Dimon v. Dimon, 40 Cal.2d 516, 526, 254 P.2d 528, 533 (1953).
168. Hudson v. Hudson, 52 Cal.2d 735, 344 P.2d 295 (1959), 48 CAmrF. L. REv. 303
(1960).
169. Lewis v. Lewis, 49 Cal.2d 389, 317 P.2d 987 (1957); Worthley v. Worthley,
44 Cal.2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955). The court in Hudson refers to these cases in 52 Cal.2d
at 741,344 P.2d at 298.
170. Dimon v. Dimon, 40 Cal.2d 516, 254 P.2d 528 (1953); Cardinale v. Cardinale,
8 Cal.2d 762, 68 P.2d 351 (1937).
171. The new rule was securely nailed down in Weber v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d
403, 348 P.2d 572, 2 Cal. Rep. 9 (1960), where Justice Traynor, now writing for a unanimous court, held that it made no difference that the husband's ex parte divorce was
obtained before the wife filed her action for support.

HeinOnline -- 13 Stan. L. Rev. 759 1960-1961

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. i3: Page 7I9

3. Miscellaneous matters. A lurid marital situation gave rise
to some zany legal arguments, particularly concerning res judicata,
in Rediker v. Rediker "' The case, with some detail omitted for
the sake of clarity, involved a husband, who upon being sued for
separate maintenance, cross-complained for annulment on the
ground that at the time of their marriage the plaintiff was the wife
of another. He got nowhere with this, since it was found that the
plaintiff was divorced from her former husband six years prior to
her marriage to the defendant. The defendant did succeed, however, in persuading the trial court (i) that the ex parte divorce
which he had obtained in Cuba from his own first wife was void,
and (2) that an ex parte Florida divorce obtained by his first wife
some five years after his marriage to the plaintiff established conclusively that there was a valid and subsisting marriage between
the defendant and his first wife at that time. On the basis of these
arguments the trial court annulled the marriage as bigamous.
The first argument was so patently frivolous that it is difficult
to conceive how the trial court could have been gulled by it. The
defendant was domiciled in Cuba when he obtained the divorce
from his first wife, and the fact that the defendant in that action
was not personally served was immaterial; moreover, the defendant, as the moving party, was estopped to attack the validity of the
Cuban divorce. The second argument was no more substantial,
but had a certain superficial plausibility: An existing valid marriage is a condition precedent to divorce under Florida law; the
decree of divorce necessarily imported a finding that there was a
subsisting marriage; a divorce decree is a judgment in rem, binding
on all the world; ergo, it follows that the defendant was still married to his first wife when he married the plaintiff. My first reaction was to classify this along with arguments sometimes made
by the poorer law students, which are so farfetched that they cannot
be refuted by authority, no one ever having had the temerity to
advance them in court, and can only be dismissed as nonsense.
Justice Traynor, however, writing for a unanimous court, laid down
a scathing barrage of authority, reason, and policy considerations
to demolish the argument. The power of the opinion is such as to
suggest that it was written with a betatron. It is a pity, all the same,
that so much judicial industry and talent should have to be wasted
in refutation of arguments that border on the irresponsible.
172. 35 Cal.2d 796, 221 P.2d 1, 20 A.L.R.2d 1152 (1950), 2 HAsrGS L.c. 86.
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In Scott P.Scott 7' the court upheld an ex parte Mexican divorce,
finding that the plaintiff in the divorce proceeding was domiciled
in Mexico at the time. Justice Traynor wrote a concurring
opinion in order to (i) discourage any implication that domicile
was requisite in all cases to recognition of foreign-country divorces,
and (2) drain some of the nonsense out of section 1915 of the Code

of Civil Procedure, which provides: "A final judgment of any
other tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction, according
to the laws of such country, to pronounce the judgment, shall have
the same effect as in the country where rendered, and also the same
effect as final judgments rendered in this state." So doing, he outlined some good law for the future. A country other than the domicile may have a legitimate interest in the marital status, and, if so,
our monolithic attitude toward domicile should not be permitted
to inject uncertainty into matters of status. On the other hand,
even if the divorcing court had jurisdiction under its own law,
California must reserve its freedom to withhold recognition because of limitations of due process or local policy. "[W]e cannot
the Legislature meant to override such
assume that in section 171915
4
limitations or policy.'

In Rozan v. Rozan,'7 ' speaking for a unanimous court, Justice
Traynor squarely placed California in the ranks of those states
which, rising above the anaemic negativism of Fall v. Eastin 76
will accord full faith and credit to foreign decrees ordering the
conveyance of local land. Though the precise question was not
before the court-here the California courts were ordering conveyance of North Dakota land-Justice Traynor characteristically
seized the occasion to establish the proper rule to be applied if the
situation were reversed, and did so in such a conclusively convincing manner that it is impossible to conceive that the opinion will
not be accepted as authoritative on the point. My own enthusiasm
for this result has been revealed elsewhere, and need not be reiterated.
Bernhardv. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n. 8 is not
a conflict-of-laws case at all; yet my interest in the case over the
173.
174.
175.
176.

51 Cal.2d 249, 331 P.2d 641 (1958).
Id. at 256, 331 P.2d at 645.
49 Cal.2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957), 11 OaA. L. RFv. 214 (1958).
215 U.S. 1 (1909).

177. Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees,21 U. Cm. L. REv. 620

(1954).

178. 19 CaI.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), 57 HARv.L. REv. 98 (1943).
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years has been heightened by its potential interstate significance.
In the purely domestic context the overthrow of the mutuality rule
as to collateral estoppel may not cause serious repercussions; the
informed reaction is likely to be that this represents desirable
progress away from the artificialities of the common law (though
this reaction may well be tempered by doubts as to the anomalous
results to which complete overthrow may lead in the case of multiple claimants)."' When one considers the effect to which a judgment is entitled in other states under the full faith and credit clause,
however, a new dimension is added. Thus if a plaintiff may choose
to sue in any one of a dozen states, his use of the initiative in such
a way as to force a defense in a very inconvenient forum raises
doubts that are not apparent when attention is focused on the
domestic scene. When all is said, however, one remains enthusiastic about the overthrow of the mutuality rule, and happy that
Justice Traynor went beyond the necessities of the case in order
to accomplish it. 8 If the language of the opinion is nevertheless
too broad, the case-by-case method of the common law can be
expected to contain it. 8'
IV.

JURISDICTION OF COURTS

i. In general. Certain opinions relating to jurisdiction of courts
require only brief mention. Reynolds v. Reynolds 82 affirmed the
continuing jurisdiction of the court in which the defendant has
appeared to modify an order for support upon proper notice, although the defendant has left the state.' 83 Redicker v. Redicker "'
179. See Currie, Mutuality of CollateralEstoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine,
9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957).
180. Id. at 322. There remain critics of the decision, however. See EHRENZWtEiO,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 225-28 (1959); Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of
Judgments, 35 Tnt.. L. REv. 301 (1961).
181. A district court of appeal has refused to apply the broad language of Bernhard
in the multiple-claimant situation. Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App.2d 762, 327 P.2d
111 (1958) (petition for hearing by supreme court denied August 28, 1958).
Collateral estoppel is a tricky problem, and discussion of it always involves some risk
of inappropriate statement. See Currie, Book Review, 73 HAv L. REv. 801, 807 n.25
(1960). Jeremy Bentham, before Justice Traynor the foremost critic of the mutuality
rule, said: "It is right enough that a verdict obtained by A against B should not bar the
claim of a third party C; but that it should not be evidence in favor of C against B, seems
the very height of absurdity." 7 BENTHAM, WoMs 171 (Bowring ed. 1840). Of course
what he meant to say was that, if A sues B and loses, B should not be able to plead the
verdict in defense against C, who was not a party; but that if A prevails over B, C should be
entitled to use the verdict against B. Indignor quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus.
182. 21 Cal.2d 580, 134 P.2d 251 (1943).
183. The principle of continuing jurisdiction and the requirement of adequate notice
were also recognized in Lewis v. Lewis, 49 Cal.2d 389, 317 P.2d 987 (1957).
184. 35 Cal.2d 796, 221 P.2d 1 (1950).
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as we have seen, denied the jurisdiction of a court not having jurisdiction of both parties to a divorce proceeding to determine that
there was a subsisting valid marriage, though the divorce decree
itself is entitled to recognition.1 McDonald v. Superior Courti.
gave a liberal construction to California's nonresident motorist
Its authorization of substituted service on the nonresident
statute :l..
owner in "any action .. growing out of any accident or collision
resulting from the operation of any motor vehicle upon the highways of this State by himself or agent" was held to cover an accident occurring in the process of unloading an allegedly defective
truck rented from the defendant for immediate use on California
highways.188 And Rozan v. Rozan,' as we have seen, affirmed the
jurisdiction of a California court, having the defendant before it,
to order a conveyance of land in another state. 90
A case of more than passing interest is Owens v. Superior
Court.' At a time when both parties were residents of California,
the plaintiff was bitten by the defendant's dog. The defendant
moved to Arizona, and thereafter plaintiff sued in California,
obtaining an order for service by publication and serving defendant
personally in Arizona. The defendant appeared specially and
moved to quash.
California's statutes providing for extraterritorial service of
process were not, and still are not, aptly designed to take advantage
of the Supreme Court's relaxation in recent years of due process
restrictions."' Sections 412 and 413 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which in terms appear to authorize service by publication generally,
had been construed as limited by traditional conceptions of due
process' 9 In an effort to adjust to modern conceptions the legislature enacted section 417, which, ironically, is in the form of a
limitation on sections 412 and 413:
Where jurisdiction is acquired over a person who is outside of this
State by publication of summons in accordance with Sections 412 and
185. See text accompanying note 171 supra.

186. 43 Cal.2d 621, 275 P.2d 464 (1954).
187. CAL.

VEHICLE CODE §

404.

188. Cf. Nelson v. Miller, 11111. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
189. 49 Cal.2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957).
190. See text accompanying note 175 supra.
191. 52 Cal.2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959), 48 CtAixs. L. REv. 295 (1960), 60 COLum.
L. REv. 237 (1960), 7 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 808 (1960).
192. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam
jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Cm. L. Rav. 569 (1958); Note, Developments in the
Law: State-Court Jurisdiction,73 HALv. L. REv. 909 (1960).

193. See, e.g., De la Montanya v. De la Montanya, 112 Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 345 (1896).
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the court shall have the power to render a personal judgment against
such person only if he was personally served with a copy of the summons
and complaint, and was a resident of this State (a) at the time of the
commencement of the action, or (b) at the time that the cause of action
arose, or (c) at the time of service.
413,

In Owens the defendant was not a resident of the state at the commencement of the action, nor at the time of service. There was
statutory basis for the exercise of jurisdiction, therefore, only because he was a resident at the time the cause of action arose.
Is the domicile of the defendant in the state at the time the cause
of action arose, without more, an adequate constitutional basis for
the exercise of jurisdiction? Justice Traynor conceded this to
be a debatable question. On the other hand, the cause of action
arose out of the defendant's activities in the state; and no constitutional objection to the exercise of jurisdiction would be tenable in
such circumstances. Yet the California statute did not provide for
injuries to local residents growing out of activities of the defendant
within the state. For a majority of the court, and with the aid of
a severability clause, Justice Traynor concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction was authorized by section 417 by reason of the
defendant's domicile in the state at the time the cause of action
arose; and, while that provision of the section might be unconstitutional in some applications, it was not so in the circumstances
of the instant case, since recognizing California's interest in providing a forum in those circumstances did no violence to conceptions of fair play and substantial justice. Thus the court did a workmanlike job of making bricks without straw-of reaching a just
and desirable result in the absence of adequate legislative implementation of the powers of the courts under modern constitutional
doctrine.
2. Parent and child. According to the Restatement, "A state
can exercise through its courts jurisdiction to determine the custody
of children . .. only if the domicil of the person placed under
custody . . . is within the state."19 But in I944 Professor Dale F.
Stansbury of Duke University took a cool, hard look at the cases
and concluded that this dogma bears little resemblance to what
courts do in fact, and still less to what they must be able to do if
they are to deal at all adequately with the human and social prob194. RESTATEMENT, CoNFLIcr oF LAws § 117 (1934). Somewhat grudgingly, a
state is conceded power to appoint a "temporary guardian" of a person found within its
territory. Id. § 118.
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lems of child custody. "A court of any state that has a substantial
interest in the welfare of the child or in the preservation of the
family unit of which he is a part, has jurisdiction to determine his
custody, and this jurisdiction may exist in two or more states at
the same time."'05 In Sampsell v. Superior Court 9 Justice Traynor, speaking for a bare majority, enthusiastically endorsed the
Stansbury position; yet the decision, if limited to the facts of the
case before the court, could give no offense to the American Law
Institute, since the child was, technically at least, domiciled in California when the action was filed.
In the beginning the husband and wife lived together in California with their child. They separated, and the wife left California, taking the child with her, intending to obtain a Nevada divorce
and then make her home in Utah. While she and the child were
in Nevada, and before they went to Utah, the husband filed suit
for divorce in California, and the wife appeared in the action. The
trial court denied the husband's petition for an order awarding him
custody pendente lite on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to
enter such an order, and the case reached the supreme court on
the husband's petition for mandamus.
It would have been sufficient, in order to dispose of the pending
action, to hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter a custody decree because the child was domiciled in California at the
time the action was brought. The court did so hold, on two rather
technical bases: (i) a demurrer admitted the allegation of domicile and (2) even if the child's domicile followed that of the
mother, with whom he was living, rather than that of the father,
the mother did not lose her California domicile until she reached
Utah, her intended home; and jurisdiction, once attached, was not
lost by the subsequent establishment of a Utah domicile. If a makeweight argument had been desired, it could have been found in the
fact that the court had personal jurisdiction of both parents. Such
narrow justifications for the decision were not satisfactory to
Justice Traynor and the majority of the court. They undertook to
clarify the whole vexed problem of custody jurisdiction, with the
salutary result that trial courts were given maximum freedom to
deal with the merits of custody cases. At the same time, there was
195. Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Across State Lines, 10 LAw & CoNTwMw.
PRoB. 819, 831-32 (1944).
196. 32 Cal.2d 763, 197 P.2d 839 (1948), 57 MfcH. L. REv. 703 (1949), 22 So.
CAL. L. Rnv. 293 (1949).

HeinOnline -- 13 Stan. L. Rev. 765 1960-1961

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. i3: Page 719

to be no arrogant or exclusive exercise or assertion of the power:
the trial courts were to exercise a sound discretion, taking into
account the interests of other states, and there was no thought that
California's decrees were to be conclusive. Such decrees were modifiable at home, and would be similarly modifiable by the courts of
any interested state.
The rather passionate dissent, apart from criticizing allowance
of mandamus as a matter of procedure,"'t concentrated on the
futility of ordering the trial court to assume jurisdiction to issue
an order it probably could not enforce 98 But the majority did not
command the trial court to award custody to the father. It only
required the court to recognize that it had jurisdiction to hear the
application on the merits and to exercise a wise discretion. It was
specifically left free "to refuse to determine the custody of the
minor child in the pending proceeding."' 99
The Sampsell case, together with Professor Stansbury's article,
has persuaded the American Law Institute of the error of its monolithic requirement of domicile.2 0
A question may be raised as to how the Sampsell case comports
with the subsequent decision of the United States Supreme Court
in May v. Anderson.2"' There Wisconsin, where the children were
technically domiciled (though they were actually living with their
mother in Ohio), awarded custody to the father in a divorce action,
the mother not having been personally served in Wisconsin. Thereafter the children lived with him in Wisconsin for a time; but when
the mother refused to surrender them after a visit to Ohio, the
father sought their release on habeas corpus. Ohio ordered their
release to the father, treating the Wisconsin decree as conclusive. 02
The Supreme Court reversed. Finding an analogy in the cases
holding that ex parte divorce decrees, while entitled to recognition
as dissolving the bonds of matrimony, could not cut off support
197. A matter which is beyond the scope of this paper.
198. 32 Cal.2d at 788-90, 197 P.2d at 755-56 (Schauer, J.).
199. Id. at 780, 197 P.2d at 750.
200. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw CONTINuED, CoNFLicT Or LAws § 177 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1953); RESTATEMENT (SEcoNm), CoNFLIcr oF LAws § 144a (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1957). The new § 117 recognizes three bases of jurisdiction: domicile, physical presence,
and personal jurisdiction of the adverse claimants.
201. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
202. "[T]he Probate Court decided that it was obliged by the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the Constitution of the United States to accept the Wisconsin decree as binding
upon the mother." Id. at 529. "The children were domiciled in Wisconsin . . . where
the Wisconsin court had exclusive jurisdiction.
...
Anderson v. May, 48 Ohio Op. 132,
136, 107 N.E.2d 358, 362 (1952).
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rights, it asserted that "a mother's right to custody of her children
is a personal right entitled to at least as much protection as her right
to alimony." ' 3 Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred on the ground
that the Court was deciding only that full faith and credit did not
require Ohio to treat the Wisconsin decree as conclusive. Justices
Jackson and Reed dissented on the ground that the decree of the
domiciliary court was entitled to full faith and credit. Mr. Justice
Minton dissented on the ground that the constitutional question
was not presented by the record. Mr. Justice Clark took no part
in the decision. Thus the opinion of the Court represents the views
of only four of the Justices: Burton (the author), Vinson, Black,
and Douglas.
It is not easy to adopt an unqualified position regarding the
opinion of the Court. A more promising approach is to state several
propositions concerning it:
i. It rejects the Restatement view that the state of the child's
domicile has exclusive jurisdiction. To that extent, as Justice
Traynor would no doubt agree, it is sound.
2. It enables other interested states-here the state in which the
children were physically present with their mother-to reexamine
the custody question without regard to whether the decree was
modifiable in the state of rendition, 2" and without being limited
by any requirement of a showing of changed circumstances, or of
evidence not presented to the rendering court. This does not quite
square with the usual formula for according qualified faith and
credit to such decrees, but one wonders how much practical difference the divergence makes. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Jackson, with its rigorous demand for full faith and credit until
there has been a properly ceremonious modification of the decree,
would hardly be an acceptable substitute for the opinion of the
Court.

3. It affords the mother a realistic opportunity to appear and
be heard, and that of itself cannot be offensive to believers in due
process of law. True, it gives her little more than the right, that
even the dissent would concede her, to seek a modification of the
decree in Ohio's courts; but to the extent that this is so it serves
only to show that the difference between Burton and Jackson was
203. 345 U.S. at 534.
204. This, however, may be an academic matter, since such decrees are probably
modifiable in all states.
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a narrow one. True, also, the mother might have appeared in the
Wisconsin divorce proceeding and litigated the custody issue there;
but in mere matters of custody there is not the same social urgency
to dispense with personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse that
exists where the purpose of the action is to dissolve the marital
relationship.
4. Despite Mr. Justice Frankfurter's disclaimer, it is difficult to
read the opinion of the Court as not laying down the rule that
the decree of the domiciliary state is wanting in due process and
void as to the mother, in the absence of personal service, even in the
rendering state. In this aspect the decision may have most unfortunate effects. It may, for example, lead trial courts to deny their
jurisdiction to make custody orders, even when the child is present
and domiciled within the state, for lack of jurisdiction over the
absent parent. That would fly in the face of common sense, as well
as of the principles of Sampsell, Stansbury, and the new Restatement. But no discriminating court should react in any such way.
The opinion of the Court protects only the rights of parents, and
the domiciliary court is justified in asserting jurisdiction to settle
the question of custody (subject to modification) for all other purposes. Moreover, the limited scope of the opinion of the Court, to
be noted immediately, provides a sound reason why any court
having jurisdiction under Sampsell should exercise it notwithstanding May v. Anderson.
5. The opinion has a very narrowly confined sphere of operation. Under Ohio law it was settled that habeas corpus was not an
appropriate procedure for determining in plenary fashion the issue
of custody. "[T]hat writ tests only the immediate right to
possession of the children. It does not open the door for the modification of any prior award of custody on a showing of changed
circumstances. Nor is it available as a procedure for settling the
future custody of children in the first instance." ' The right to
immediate custody may well have been of crucial importance;
being given that right, the husband might spirit the children out
of the state before the wife could take appropriate action to have
the issue settled in plenary fashion. With only this question before
it, the Ohio court treated as conclusive the decree of a court having
no personal jurisdiction of the wife. She could not introduce evidence of changed circumstances; she could not introduce evidence
205. 345 U.S. at 532.
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that was not before the Wisconsin court. In short, a decree that
was modifiable and nonfinal was given final and preclusive effect:
it was accorded more force than would have been given it in the
state in which it was rendered. It is one thing to say that personal
jurisdiction of the absent parent is not necessary when she has the
right, before the children are taken from her, to be heard on the
question of modification and changed circumstances; it is quite
another to say that personal jurisdiction is not necessary when the
decree is to be treated as cutting off her right to be heard altogether.
Hence I find no substantial threat in May v. Anderson to the
admirable solution of custody jurisdiction outlined in Sampsell.
California trial courts may and should continue to determine questions of custody in proper cases without jurisdiction of the absent
parent; in the normal custody proceeding in another state, where
the questions of modification and future custody are open, the
decree will be given the usual effect, and the objection that there
was no personal jurisdiction will have no force. It is only when
procedural rules in the second state give excessive weight to foreign
decrees that the principle of May v. Anderson comes into operation.
To give a foreign judgment more faith and credit than it has in the
state from which it is taken may certainly constitute a denial of
due process of law."'
I have heard fears expressed that May v. Anderson may hamper
the right of a state in which a child is domiciled, or present, to bind
an absent parent by an adoption decree. That would be a very
serious consequence, indeed; but I believe, or at least hope, that
the rule of the case would not be so far extended. The foregoing
discussion of the limited scope of the decision supports this hope.
In addition, it may be noted that adoption has to do with "status"
in a way that custody certainly does not.2 " This is an unsatisfactory
way of saying that strong considerations of social policy demand
that courts have power to act upon a relationship-especially an
incapacitating one-although the conditions are not ideal for doing
perfect justice to all interested parties, and that no comparable
exigency exists when what is involved is not a final change of relationship but only a provisional arrangement for physical care.
It would be intolerable if a deserted wife, having found a new help206. This kind of denial of due process occurred, I believe, in Harnischfeger Sales
Corp. v. Sternberg Dredging Co., 189 Miss. 73, 191 So. 94 (1939).
207. See Stansbury, Cistody and Maintenance Across State Lines, 10 LAw & CoNTOa. PRoB. 819, 826 (1944).
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mate, could not divorce her husband without personal service on
him; it would be equally intolerable if an abandoned child for
whom a foster parent has been found could not be adopted without
personal service on the absent parent. The welfare of the child
requires, too, that any state having an interest in him or in the
family unit be able to make provisional arrangements for his custody; but since there is involved no question of family relationship
or obligation or incapacity there is no urgent need to cut off the
rights of the absent parent, and so we do not ordinarily do so, but
handle the matter by nonfinal, modifiable decrees. May v. Anderson simply plugs one small hole in this plan: an ex parte decree
intended to be provisional only must not be treated as preclusive.
Interestingly enough, somewhat similar considerations are involved in another of Justice Traynor's opinions. In Hartford
v. Superior Court..8 a seventeen-year-old boy sought a declaratory
judgment establishing that he was the illegitimate child of the nonresident defendant, who was not personally served in California.
The supreme court was unanimous in granting a writ of mandamus requiring that service of summons be quashed. It was properly
unimpressed by the plaintiff's argument that, since the purpose of
the proceeding was to establish the status of parent and child, the
action was "in rem." There is a difference, said Justice Traynor, between severing a relationship, or declaring its nonexistence,
and establishing a relationship. Thus an ex parte divorce adjudicates that the parties are free from the bonds of matrimony, but not
that there was a subsisting valid marriage. California might reasonably assert jurisdiction over a nonresident to determine that the
relation of parent and child did not exist, so as to free its domiciliary
from handicaps; but the purpose and effect of a judgment establishing a relationship would be to preclude relitigation of the issue
in disputes over personal rights and obligations. "Basically the difference is between the state's power to insulate its domiciliary from
a relationship with one not within its jurisdiction and its lack of
power to reach out and fasten a relationship upon a person over
whom it has no jurisdiction."2' °9 The significance of this reasoning
as supporting jurisdiction in cases of adoption without personal
service on the absent parent is clear.
3. Foreigncorporations.Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. Superior
208. 47 Cal.2d 447, 304 P.2d 1 (1956), 30 So. CAL.L. PIv. 336 (1957), 4 U.C.LA.L.
Rav.647 (1957).
209. 47 Cal.2d at 454, 304 P.2d at 5.
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Court21' gave the California court the opportunity to take two constructive steps, one of them of far-reaching importance: (i) To
declare that local statutes authorizing substituted service on foreign
corporations "doing business in this State" impose no limitation
not imposed by the due process clause; and (2) to state that there
is no difference for jurisdictional purposes between the activity of
buying and the activity of selling within the state. The second
proposition would seem to present no great difficulty, since no
practical or conceptual difference between buying and selling, for
jurisdictional purposes, is readily conceivable; yet most of the
precedents were concerned with selling activities, and the proffered
distinction had to be dealt with. The first proposition is of more
moment. Prior to InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington21 state
statutes of this sort had been restrictively construed under the compulsion of old notions as to the restraints imposed by the due
process clause. If a state is to take full advantage of the liberating
decision in InternationalShoe, it must somehow, by legislation or
by judicial construction, put its house in order by modernizing its
statutes providing for service of process. It is eminently reasonable
for the courts to bring this about, simply by declaring that statutes
whose scope had been compressed by restrictive concepts resumed
their full body as soon as the pressure was removed. This Justice
Traynor did:
[The term "doing business"] is a descriptive one that the courts have
equated with such minimum contacts with the state "that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " . .. Whatever limitation it imposes is equivalent to
that of the due process clause. "'[D]oing business' within the meaning
of section 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure is synonymous with the
power of the state to subject foreign corporations to local process." 212

Other states will save themselves and their citizens trouble by doing
likewise.
The broad principle of the Jahn case was reaffirmed in Carl F.
W. Borgward, G.M.B.H. v. Superior Court.21 In both of these
cases the cause of action had arisen out of the local activities of the
foreign corporation, and in both Justice Traynor, faithful to
the reasoning of the Supreme Court in InternationalShoe, had
210.
211.
212.
213.

49 Cal.2d 855, 323 P.2d 437 (1958).
326 U.S. 310, 161 A.L.R. 1057 (1945).
49 Cal.2d at 858, 323 P.2d at 439.
51 CaM.2d 72, 330 P.2d 789 (1958).
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given appropriate weight to that fact. But Fisher Governor Co. v.
Superior Court21 provided a test of this indication that the court
was committed to a course of moderation and restraint, limiting
jurisdiction in cases of "minimum contacts" to cases in which California had an interest in providing a forum. Actions for wrongful
death and personal injuries occurring in Idaho were brought
against the defendant in California on the theory that its sales
activities there were sufficient to subject it to jurisdiction. Those
activities were such as to support jurisdiction if local injury to a
local resident had stemmed from them. But "In the present case,
the causes of action arose in Idaho, the defective equipment was
not sold in this state, neither of the decedents was a California resident, and none of the plaintiffs are California residents. The causes
of action are not related to any business done by Fisher here." ' '
After a thorough review of the considerations bearing upon the
propriety of assuming jurisdiction over foreign corporations under
International Shoe, Justice Traynor concluded that to assume it
here would not be consistent with "the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process
clause to insure,"216 and hence that it could not constitutionally be
assumed. The court had passed the test with flying colors.21 7
4. Jurisdiction over intangibles. The last opinion to be considered is one of Justice Traynor's boldest and most controversial, and
deserves far greater attention than it can be given here. Two groups
of California musicians filed actions against their employersproducers of motion pictures and phonograph records-to prevent
the consummation of contracts whereby funds deducted from their
wages were to be paid to a New York trustee for certain union
purposes. All parties having a substantial interest, including the
union, were before the court; but there had been only constructive
service on the New York trustee. For this reason the trial court
ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief sought. The
supreme court unanimously issued its mandate, holding that the
trial court had jurisdiction quasi in rem to determine the conflicting claims to the intangible property." 8
214. 53 Cal.2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1 Cal. Rep. 1 (1959), 1960 Wis. L. REv. 549.
215. 53 Cal.2d at 224, 347 P.2d at 3, 1 Cal. Rep. at 3.
216. Id. at 225, 347 P.2d at 3, 1 Cal. Rep. at 3.
217. Although the record presented only an issue as to whether service should be
quashed for want of jurisdiction, it is interesting to me that justice Traynor made no
reference to the doctrine of forum non conveniens, but forthrightly made the decision one
of constitutional principle.
218. Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting System v. Atkinson, 357 U.S.
569 (1958), 46 CsA~F. L. REv. 637 (1958), 10 SrTAx. L. Rnv. 750 (1958).
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Traditional doctrine would deny this jurisdiction; yet on every
consideration of common sense it ought to be recognized. Except
for the fact that the trustee was a nonresident, all the parties and
all the facts were associated with California alone. On the basis of
traditional doctrine, no state would be competent to adjudicate the
interests of all parties without their submission to jurisdiction; any
attempt to exercise jurisdiction would be attended by the risk of
double liability.219 The court was handicapped in dealing with the
problem, as it has been on other occasions, by the failure of the
legislature to modernize the statutes on service of process. No California statute authorized service as a basis for a personal judgment
against the trustee. If there had been such a statute, the court could
have taken advantage of the Supreme Court's willingness to disregard the categorization of jurisdiction as in personam or in rem, 2"'
and could have brought directly to bear the entire arsenal of modern
thinking on jurisdiction in personam. Perhaps, however, it is just
as well for the development of the law that the jurisdiction had to
be sustained in rem or not at all; for the consequence of this limitation was that Justice Traynor, instead of treating the case in traditional terms of the "situs" of the intangible and the purposes for
which the situs state can exercise jurisdiction, appealed to the
modern conceptions of interest and fairness applied in such cases
as InternationalShoe and asserted their relevance for jurisdiction
in rem as well. No more useful service could be performed for this
benighted area of the law.2 '
Two decisions of the United States Supreme Court stood in the
way of the desired result, apparently establishing that, while the
state in which an obligor is found has jurisdiction to apply the obligation to payment of a claim against the obligee, it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate that an adverse claimant has rights superior
to those of the nonresident obligee: Bank of Jasper v. First Nat'l
Bank"2 ' and New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy.22 The Jasper
case could be distinguished on the ground that there the obligation
was embodied in a negotiable instrument not within the state;
Dunlevy was another matter, and the attempt to distinguish it is
219. The defendant employers might have interpleaded the rival claimants in a
federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1958), although in view of the character of the union
as an unincorporated association it is not completely clear that the requisite diversity of
citizenship was present. Cf. 3 MooaE, FEDanas PRAcTica "22.09, at 3026 (2d ed. 1948).
220. Cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
221. See Note, Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction,73 HAv. L. Rev.
909, 956-60 (1960).
222. 258 U.S. 112 (1922).
223. 241 U.S.518 (1916).
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not convincing.224 The strength of the opinion lies in its rejection
of Dunlevy, and in its resort to considerations of practicality and
fairness in judicial administration: "We find no relevance in the
distinction ... between jurisdiction to take over a nonresident's
claim to a chose in action admittedly
his and jurisdiction to estab25
lish that it was never his."
It is doubtful whether today the United States Supreme Court would deny
to a state court the interstate interpleader jurisdiction that federal courts
may exercise. A remedy that a federal court may provide without violating due process of law does not become unfair or unjust because it is
sought in a state court instead. To sustain jurisdiction in these cases,
however, we are not required to forecast the overruling of the Dunlevy
case and act on that basis. For the reasons stated above, this case is
clearly distinguishable from the Dunlevy case, and the multiple contacts
with this state fully sustain the jurisdiction of the superior court to exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over the intangibles in question. 2 6

Perhaps because of the unconvincing character of the distinctions drawn, a colleague of mine has frowned and commented that
a good result was achieved "by way of an ingenious doctrine of
quasi-in-ren jurisdiction." 227 Any disparaging connotations of this
point of view must be rejected. There is nothing devious about
rejecting judicial error; and Justice Traynor said as plainly as
a state-court judge becomingly can that he did not recognize the
authority of the Supreme Court's decision. What a judge cannot
say a commentator can say for him (without authority, of course):
The Dunlevy case was wrong when it was decided, and would
almost certainly not be followed in the light of modern developments in the law.
As I read it, Dunlevy is based on two propositions: (i) Even in
a garnishment proceeding, which is a proceeding quasi-in-rem, a
224. "[B]ut the court was careful to point out that the interpleader action 'initiated
by the company was an altogether different matter' from the garnishment proceedings
and that under the applicable state law a judgment exonerating the garnishee was not
binding on the absent debtor whose claim against the garnishee the local creditors had
unsuccessfully attempted to reach." 49 Cal.2d at 344, 338 P.2d at 963-64. But it would
seem to make no difference whether the proceeding is initiated by the stakeholder or by
one of the adverse claimants; and the effect of a judgment exonerating the garnishee is not
merely a matter of state law, but of due process. The first point, however, is reiterated:
"The present case is not one in which an obligor has ... sought to compel conflicting
claimants to adjudicate their rights in a forum of his own choice." Id. at 347, 338 P.2d

at 966.

225. Id. at 346, 338 P.2d at 965.
226. Id. at 348, 338 P.2d at 966.

227. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause, and the In Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Cm. L. RBv. 569, 619 (1958).
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judgment that the garnishee is not indebted to the defendant, but
to another, does not bind the absent defendant; (2) a fortiori the
same must be true of a judgment in interpleader, since that is an
equitable proceeding, and equity acts only in personam. The first
of these propositions is true, but its truth rests upon the fact that
in garnishment the defendant gets no notice of any adverse claim,
but only notice that one claiming to be his creditor is pursuing his
asset.228 Plainly, it would be a denial of due process if, on the basis
of such notice, a judgment should be entered in favor of an adverse
claimant. Consider Mrs. Dunlevy's position: In California she
receives notice that her undoubted creditor is proceeding in Pennsylvania against an asset of which she may have been in ignorance,
and to which her claim is doubtful. She may well decide to make
no contest: the worst that can happen is that the asset will be applied
to payment of the debt, and to that extent she will be in better
financial condition. If, however, she is told that there is an adverse
claim to the asset, her strategy must be different; for if she does
not defend, the asset may be lost while the debt remains unpaid. "
The second proposition is another painful instance of the mischief that can be worked by the false and trouble-making maxim,
"Equity acts in personam." For in interpleader the nonresident
claimant gets due notice of the adverse claim; Mrs. Dunlevy got
just such notice; and the only substantial reason for not holding
the judgment binding disappears. The only remaining basis for
the doctrine is that the judgment is necessarily "personal."
I find striking confirmation for the view that this kind of thinking was responsible for the Dunlevy decision in the writings of
Professor Zechariah Chafee, the great advocate of federal interpleader. Although he was keenly aware of the injustice of the
decision, he did not attack it, but acquiesced because he agreed that
the interpleader proceeding was not in rem, and there was no personal jurisdiction of the nonresident claimant. Why was the proceeding not in rem? For two reasons: (i) Notwithstanding the
garnishment cases and other analogies, Chafee was unable to accept
the "question-begging" assertion that the obligation is a res within
228. Under the decided cases, the defendant may be entitled to no notice at all other
than that given him by the garnishee. See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
229. Similarly, even if there is no adverse claim, a judgment exonerating the garnishee
may be regarded as denying due process since the creditor does not represent the debtor
and is probably in no position to prove the claim of the debtor against the garnishee.
Cf. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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the jurisdiction where the obligor brings his interpleader action. 30
(2) Even if it be assumed that the chose in action was a res within
the jurisdiction, a court could not act in rem in an interpleader suit
without the aid of statute. It is illuminating that on this ground
the power of a state to bind a nonresident was denied even where
there was unquestionably a res within the state in the form of land
or chattels:
If the res is land there is territorial jurisdiction. But since equity acts in
personam, a statute will be necessary to enable the court to determine the
rights of the claimants without personal jurisdiction over them. Statutes
enabling equity to remove clouds on title imposed by the claims of nonresidents are frequent, but it is doubtful whether interpleader can be
considered a proceeding to remove cloud on title, since the applicant
asserts no interest which he wishes protected. However, a broader statute
conferring jurisdiction in rem where the interpleader concerns domestic
land, would be a simple matter. Now suppose that the res is a chattel
physically situated in X. If it was brought there by consent of the nonresident claimant, it is doubtful whether his rights in the chattel can be
cut off unless he personally appears. If, however, the chattel is in X by
his consent, that State has territorial jurisdiction, and a statute may give
the court jurisdiction in rem which will make it possible to bind nonresidents by interpleader as well as by other equitable proceedings. 23 '

One may fully sympathize with Chafee's distaste for questionbegging assertions as to the "situs" of intangible property. Yet the
truth is that where, as in the garnishment cases, compelling practical considerations dictate recognition of jurisdiction to proceed
against the assets of a nonresident defendant, the Supreme Court
has not scrupled to justify the result on the basis that the chose in
action is a res located within the state. In the interpleader situation
the practical considerations are even more compelling; and, if there
is no other way to sustain the jurisdiction, no great intellectual dishonesty is involved in asserting that the debt is a res within the
jurisdiction here just as much as in the garnishment cases. Chafee
could not distinguish those cases; he could only conclude that they
"should not establish a general principle of jurisdiction in rem, but
merely represent an isolated rule." ' 2 In this he was influenced by
230. "[B]ut the assumption that there is a chose in action within the jurisdiction
begs the question. If in fact the non-resident claimant is entitled to the obligation of the
insurance company, the chose in action is outside the forum, unless it be said that it exists
wherever the debtor is, and this is the very question at issue." Chafee, Interstate Interpleader, 33 YALE LJ.685, 707-8 (1924).
231. Id. at 698-99.
232. Id. at 710.
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the fear, also reflected in Justice Traynor's opinion, that from
recognizing jurisdiction in rem with respect to intangibles in interpleader "it is only a small step farther to bind the nonresident when
he is the only claimant against the debtor-plaintiff." 33 But the
practical considerations that call for recognition of jurisdiction in
rem in garnishment and interpleader obviously do not support an
attempt by a local debtor to have the courts declare that he is not
indebted to his nonresident creditor.
As to the requirement of statutory authorization to proceed in
rem, that is surely a matter of state law; apart from the fact that
it is entirely possible for such authority to be developed through
judicial decision as distinguished from statute, " 4 its existence or
nonexistence is not a matter of constitutional moment. Yet Mr.
Justice McReynolds appears to have assumed in Dunlevy that the
inability of a court of equity to act in rem is a principle of natural
law. At all events, Chafee's concern with this matter demonstrates
that the problem was not thought to be solely one of whether a
chose in action could be a res; it also concerned the powers of
courts of equity.
If it is recognized that the nonresident claimant in interpleader
must be given adequate notice of the proceedings and what they
involve, and that courts of equity can, indeed, act in rem, nothing
is left of the Dunlevy case. It is a pity that Chafee was not more
critical of the decision. He seems to have been so convinced that
federal interpleader was necessary to meet all the problems that he
was not concerned with defending the jurisdiction of the states23
But federal interpleader does not solve all the problems. If Chafee
had been more critical the impediment of Dunlevy might have
been brought down years earlier, by judges less bold and perceptive
than Justice Traynor.
CONCLUSION

This review of Justice Traynor's conflict-of-laws opinions has
been a stimulating experience for me. I was generally familiar
with most of them, and had previously studied two of them inten233. Ibid.
234. See HusToN, ThE ENFORCEMENT op DacRans IN EQmTY ch. V (1915).
235. For example, he noted that a state court would not have jurisdiction to enjoin
suits in other jurisdictions by nonresident claimants. Chafee, supra note 230, at 717-18.
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sively. This study, however, has yielded new problems, and revealed old problems in new light. The cases cover a surprising
range of subject matter-perhaps as representative a cross section
of the field as will be found in the work of any judge. Generalizations can be no substitute for the case-by-case analysis that has been
attempted; yet it must be evident that Justice Traynor is almost
invariably right in conflict-of-laws matters, and that he has brought
to the adjudication of conflicts cases an enlightened, common-sense
approach which, while not articulated as a "system," may well
foster a new age of reason in this area of superstition and sorcery.
Superlatives, too, can add little to what has been said with respect
to specific cases; and without similar studies of the work of other
judges I would hesitate to make comparisons. Yet until other such
studies are available I submit that the evidence points to Justice
Traynor as preeminent in the conflict of laws."'
236. This paper had been completed when Justice Traynor's opinion for the unanimous court in Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Adv. Cal. 591, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rep. 266
(1961) was filed; but so revolutionary an opinion cannot go unremarked. It is probably
the only judicial opinion concerning the Statute of Frauds in the conflict of laws that does
not so much as mention the substance-procedure dichotomy. The analysis is explicitly in
terms of governmental policies and interests. The problem is approached as one of statutory construction. The restraint and moderation with which domestic interests are defined
raise a standard to which the wise and honest can repair, and should be a reproach to
those who feel that the method of governmental-interest analysis must necessarily produce
egocentric or provincial results. Perhaps as good a gauge as any of Traynor's stature is
provided by a comparison of the judicial statesmanship displayed here with that of one
of Holmes' better conflict-of-laws opinions in a parallel case, Emery v. Burbank, 163 Mass.
326, 39 N.E. 1026 (1895), discussed in Currie & Schreter, UnconstitutionalDiscrimination
in the Conflict of Laws, 69 YAsE L.J. 1323, 1331-35 (1960).
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